HYPOTHETICAL

You are an attorney who usually represents plaintiffs who have been injured because of the negligent actions of other individuals or businesses. On the morning of October 19 this year, a woman meets you in your office to ask for your help in bringing a lawsuit against a driver from an online ride-sharing service who she says crashed into another vehicle while taking her home from a bar and severely injured her back, both of her legs, and her right arm. She wants to sue both the driver and the ride-sharing service company for the medical bills she had to pay, the income that she lost because she could not work while she recovered from her injuries and the physical therapy she will need for the rest of her life. She also thinks the court should teach the ride-sharing company a lesson about how they need to take better care of their customers.

After you ask her to tell you the whole story of how she was injured, the woman said that on the night of November 3, 2018 she had gone to the bar where she worked as a server to celebrate a coworker's promotion to manager. During the celebration, she had a lot to drink. Rather than drive home, she took the advice of a friend to use an application on her phone to call a ride-sharing service. When the car arrived, she got in and the driver took off at what seemed to her like a very fast speed. As the ride continued, she finally got a closer look at the driver and was startled to see that it was her father, whom she had not seen since he walked out some 12 years ago, leaving the family when she was just eight years old. He didn't seem to recognize her, however, and she became more alarmed, even in her impaired state, as he sped up and swerved through traffic on a crowded main road. She overheard him muttering to himself that he needed to get to Fred Meyer before it closed and when he took a sudden right turn, she asked him to slow down. He replied, "Don't you worry, I've got a quick errand to run, but I'll get you where you're going right on time!" She finally shouted "Dad!" and implored him to be careful, which caused him to turn his head quickly, look at her with obvious shock, and call her name, not seeming to believe she was his daughter. But turning his head evidently took his attention away from his driving because he ran through a red light at an intersection. Another car that was also passing through the intersection hit the front of the car he was driving, spinning it around and causing it to hit a low wall at the side of the road and flip over. The woman said she was knocked unconscious and woke up a few minutes later, still in the car, but now unable to move her legs or get up. Soon after, she felt what she called "unbelievable" pain and passed out again, but not before seeing people looking at her from outside the car. She said she also heard her father warning people away from the car, saying something like "Don't worry, I've got this! Everything is fine! It's my daughter! I'm going to call Triple-A and get a tow truck out here. Don't worry!"

When she woke up again later, this time she was in the hospital with the rest of her family around her, but not her father. Her brother explained what had happened and that someone had called an ambulance and a rescue unit to get her out of the car. They said that doctors had operated on her for several hours in each of the past three days and were able to restore function to her legs, which at first they had thought were paralyzed because the injuries to her lower back were so severe. She asked after her father, but her brother told her they couldn't find the man who had been her driver -- he had evidently gotten out of the car, staggered away, from what some witnesses had told her brother and mother, and disappeared, leaving her trapped. After that, it took her seven months of recovery, both at the hospital and home, before she was able to walk again with any degree of comfort and return to work. Her medical bills for the surgery, physical therapy and related costs and expenses to date amounted to more than $150,000. Because she was working at a job without benefits, she didn't have any health insurance, so she was responsible for the entire bill and for all the bills she would need to pay for any future surgeries or physical therapy. On top of that, after trying to work at her old job for a few weeks with a very sympathetic manager, she finally had to quit because she could only stand for about half an hour at a time and could walk only slowly, often with a lot of effort and some pain. She then said that you are the third lawyer she has consulted about this case. She said the first lawyer she talked to suggested suing the ride-sharing company under the doctrine ofrespondiat superiorand tried to talk her into suing her father too. She agreed to sue the company but hesitated at that time about suing her father because she felt a bit guilty about distracting him while he was driving, feeling that maybe she was a little bit to blame for the accident. After the first lawyer sued the company for $500,000 in actual damages and another $300,000 in punitive damages, the company moved successfully to dismiss the suit because of a clause in the user agreement for the application she used to call for the ride and because the company claimed that her father was not an employee of the company but was instead an independent contractor. The clause required her to submit any claim she had against the company to binding arbitration. She thought the dismissal was unfair, but the first lawyer had taken the case on a 30 percent contingency fee arrangement. You know from your previous experience that a contingency arrangement is one in which the client does not pay the lawyer any money for the work he performs unless the lawyer obtains a recovery in a settlement or judgment, but that either the lawyer or client, depending on the agreement, can pay expenses necessary to investigate and bring the lawsuit. The lawyer takes his payment for his services by obtaining a percentage of the recovery. The first lawyer had already spent a few thousand dollars preparing the case. He wasn't willing to spend more time and money trying to continue the case. She then consulted a second lawyer, who told her she should appeal the dismissal on the grounds that the user agreement was an unconscionable [extremely unfair] contract and the arbitration clause should be invalidated. He also suggested that she should contest the issue of whether her father was an employee of the ride-sharing company or an independent contractor. But this lawyer wanted $4,000 up front to prepare the appeal and more money for expenses -- money she doesn't have now. She is hoping that you will agree to take the case on a contingency arrangement, and she is willing to offer you 32 percent of the recovery as an inducement. After telling the woman you would need to think the matter over and that you would get back to her tomorrow about whether you will represent her, you spend an hour looking for anything else you can find out about the matter. You run the name of the woman's father through a database service you subscribe to and learn that the police did track him down from witness reports after the accident and arrested him for leaving the scene of the accident and failing to render aid. After calling an officer you know at the police department, you learned that at the time of the arrest the father had given them several different aliases and the police therefore could not reliably establish his identity, so they did not contact the woman or her family to say they had found him and they were not aware of any familial relationship between the man they held in custody and the woman who had suffered the accident. The man later was released from jail after a friend came by to post bail, but according to court records he never showed up for his trial date. In your preliminary search, the only other record you are able to find under the name the woman gave you was a death notice in a paper published in Redmond, Oregon with a date of October 25, 2019. The notice included a line that said that neighbors of the dead man thought he was a bit strange, partly because he kept talking about having a huge amount of money hidden somewhere, but that he never seemed to display any sort of wealth. The notice did not list any surviving family members, and nothing in the notice mentioned any will or estate the man might have left behind. You also look up details of the lawsuit the woman brought against the ride-sharing company. The first lawyer filed the case on June 1st of this year, but the first hearing for the case did not occur until July 20th this year and the judge's order of dismissal was entered late last month, on September 28th.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Although the woman presents a sympathetic case and you might be able to make a lot of money if you can recover damages, you are worried that there might be a number of barriers that would prevent you from successfully representing her and obtaining a recovery. As you are considering the matter:

1. Identify which possible actions you might be able to take on the woman's behalf and when you would need to take those actions.
2. Identify the defendants against whom you would take action, if you take the woman's case.

3. Identify the initial defenses you think each defendant might use in the case against that defendant. Don't worry about arguing the case to the jury or whether you can prove negligence but focus instead on whether there are barriers that will prevent the court from even hearing the case.

4. Develop a list of any strategies you might be able to use to overcome the defendants' likely defenses so that you can win a settlement or get to trial in the case.

Finally, briefly summarize for the woman why you will or will not take her case.

A separate file included with this hypothetical shows several Oregon statutes that might be relevant to your answers. Please note that not all of the statutes in the file will apply to this problem, but be sure to consider them carefully and cite them where necessary to support your arguments.

LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AND SUITS 12.080 GENERAL PROVISIONS 12.010 Time of commencing actions. Actions shall only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action shall have accrued, except where a different limitation is prescribed by statute. [Amended by 1979 c284 43] 12.020 When action deemed begun. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, for the purpose of determining whether an action has been commenced within the time limited, an action shall be deemed commenced as to each defendant, when the complaint is led, and the sum- mons served on the defendant, or on a codefendant who is a joint contractor, or otherwise united in interest with the defend- ant. (2) If the rst publication of summons or other service of summons in an action occurs before the expiration of 60 days after the date on which the complaint in the action was led, the action against each person of Whom the court by such service has acquired jurisdiction shall be deemed to have been commenced u on the date on which the complaint in t e action was led. [Amended by 1973 c.731 1] 12.030 [Repealed by 1973 c731 2] 12.040 Limitations of suits generally; land patent suits; defense of possession by equitable title; suit on new promise, fraud or mistake. (1) A suit shall only be commenced within the time limited to com- mence an action as provided in this chapter; and a suit for the determination of any right or claim to or interest in real property shall be deemed within the limitations provided for actions for the recovery of the possession of real property. (2) No suit shall be maintained to set aside, cancel, annul or otherwise affect a patent to lands issued by the United States or this state, or to compel any person claim ing or holding under such patent to convey the lands described therein, or any portion of them, to the plaintiff in such suit, or to hold the same in trust for, or to the use and benet of such plaintiff, or on account of any matter, thing or transaction which was had, done, suffered or transpired prior to the date of such patent, unless such suit is com- menced within 10 years from the date of such patent. (3) This section shall not bar an equitable owner in possession of real property from defending possession by means of the equita- ble title; and in any action for the recovery of any real property, or the possession thereof, by any person or persons claiming or holding the legal title to the same under such patent against any person or persons in Title 2 Page 207 possession of such real property under any equitable title, or having in equity the right to the possession thereof as against the plaintiff in such action, such equitable right of possession may be pleaded by answer in such action, or set up by bill in equity to enjoin such action or execution upon any judgment rendered therein; and the right of such equitable owner to defend possession in such action, or by bill for injunction, shall not be barred by lapse of time while an ac- tion for the possession of such real property is not barred. (4) In a suit upon a new promise, fraud or mistake, the limitation shall only be deemed to commence from the making of the new romise or the discovery of the fraud or mist e. 12.050 Action to recover real property. An action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, shall be commenced within 10 years. No ac- tion shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appear that the plaintiff, an ances- tor, predecessor, or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within 10 years before the commencement of the action. 12.060 Suit or action on land con- tracts; time when they cease to affect the property. (1) Unless suit or action to en- force a contract for the sale of real property is instituted in the county in which the real property is situated within ve years from the date of maturity of the nal payment provided for'in the contract, or from the date to which the nal payment shall have been extended by agreement of record, the con- tract shall not thereafter be a lien, encum- brance, or cloud on the title of the property. (2) When the purchase price xed in the contract is payable in installments, the con- tract shall be deemed to mature on the date upon which the nal payment would be pay- able if the minimum amount of the principal due on each installment had been paid as provided in the terms of the contract. 12.070 Action on judgment, decree or sealed instrument. (1) An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States; or (2) An action upon a sealed instrument entered into before August 13, 1965, shall be commenced within 10 years. [Amended by 1965 c502 3] 12.080 Action on certain contracts 0r liabilities. (1) An action-upon a contract or liability, express or implied, excepting those mentioned in ORS 12.070, 12.110 and 12.135 and except as otherwise provided in ORS 727250; (2017 Edition) 12.085 PROCEDURE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS (2) An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture, excepting those mentioned in ORS 12.110; (3) An action for waste or trespass upon or for interference with or injury to any in- terest of another in real property, excepting those mentioned in ORS 12.050, 12.060, 12.135, 12.137 and 273.241; or (4) An action for taking, detaining or in- juring personal property, including an action for the specic recovery thereof, excepting an action mentioned in ORS 12.137; shall be commenced within six years. [Amended by 1957 0.374 3; 1961 0.726 396; 1973 c363 1; 1983 c.437 2; 1987 0.705 3; 1991 c968 2] 12.085 Action against garnishee. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, proceedings against a garnishee un der ORS 18.775 to 18.782 must be commenced within one year after the delivery of the writ of garnishment. (2) If the writ of garnishment is delivered to a person in the person's capacity as a personal representative of an estate, pro ceedings against the garnishee under ORS 18.775 to 18.782 must be commenced within one year after the entry of a judgment of nal distribution for the estate. [1977 c.786 3; 1981 c383 29; 2001 c249 66; 2003 c.85 1; 2003 6.576 279al 12.090 Accounts; accrual of cause of action. In an action to recover a balance due upon an account, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued from the time of the last charge or payment proved in the account. Interest, nancing and carrying charges shall not be deemed such a charge. [Amended by 1973 c.204 1] 12.100 Action on ofcial act or pen- alty. (1) An action against a sheriff or constable upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in an ofcial capacity and in virtue of the ofce of the sheriff or constable; or by the omission of an ofcial duty, including the nonpayment of money collected upon an execution, but not includ- ing an action for an escape, shall be com- menced within three years. (2) An action upon a statute for penalty or forfeiture, where the action is given to the party aggrieved, or to such party and the state, excepting those actions mentioned in ORS 12.110, shall be commenced within three years. [Amended by 1957 c374 M; 1965 C221 10]' 12.110 Actions for certain injuries to person not arising on contract; action for overtime or premium pay; action for professional malpractice; effect of fraud or deceit; action for injuries to person arising from nuclear incident. (1) An ac- Title 2 Page 208 tion for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not es- pecially enumerated in this chapter, shall be commenced within two years; provided, that in an action at law based upon fraud or deceit, the limitation shall be deemed to commence only from the discovery of the fraud or deceit. (2) An action upon a statute for a forfei- ture or penalty to the state or county shall be commenced within two years. (3) An action for overtime or premium pay or for penalties or liquidated damages for failure to pay overtime or premium pay shall be commenced within two years. (4) An action to recover damages for in- juries to the person arising from any med- ical, surgical or dental treatment, omission or operation shall be commenced within two years from the date when the injury is rst discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered. However, notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 12.160, every such action shall be commenced within ve-years from the date of the treat- ment, omission or operation upon which the action is based or, if there has been no ac- tion commenced within ve years because of fraud, deceit or misleading representation, then within two years from the date such fraud, deceit or misleading representation is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered. (5) An action, arising from a nuclear in- cident, as dened in 42 U.S.C. 2014(q), that involves the release of radioactive material, excluding releases from acts of war, that causes bodily injury, sickness or death, shall be commenced: (a) 'Within two years from the time an injured person discovers or reasonably could have discovered the injury and the causal connection between the injury and the nu- clear incident; or (b) Within two years from any substantial change in the degree of injury to the person arising out of a nuclear incident. [Amended by 1957 c374 1; 1967 (L406 1; 1969 3.642 1; 1971 c.473 1; 1975 c796 10a; 1981 c.149 1; 1987 c705 4] 12.115 Action for negligent injury to person, or property. (1) In no event shall any action for negligent injury to person or property of another be commenced more than 10 years from the date of the act or omission complained of. (2) Nothing in this section shall be con- strued to extend any period of limitation otherwise established by law, including but not limited to the limitations established by ORS 12.110. [1967 0.406 21 (2017 Edition) 'M'Af 12.195 after the death of the person. [Amended by 1969 0.591 9268] 12.195 Effect of attorney death on limitations. Notwithstanding the time es- tablished by statute for the commencement of an action, a person must commence the action within 180 days after the death of an attorney for the person, or within the time established by statute for the commencement of the action, whichever is later, if: (1) The attorney has agreed to represent the person in the action; (2) The attorneyclient relationship be- tween the person and the attorney is con rmed in a writing prepared by the attorney or at the direction of the attorney; and (3) The attorney dies before the expira- tion of the time allowed by statute for com- mencement of the action. [2005 0.457 2] Note: 12.195 was added to and made a part of ORS chapter 12 by legislative action but was not added to any smaller series therein. See Preface to Oregon Re- vised Statutes for further explanation. 12.200 Suspension by war as to alien. When a person is an alien subject or citizen of a country at war with the United States, the time of the continuance of the war shall not be a part of the period limited for the commencement of the action. 12.210 Suspension by injunction or prohibition of statute. When the com- mencement of an action is stayed by injunc tion or a statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibi- tion shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 12.220 Commencement of new action after involuntary dismissal. (1) Notwith- standing ORS 12.020, if an action is led with a court within the time allowed by statute, and the action is involuntarily dis- missed without prejudice on any ground not adjudicating the merits of the action, or is involuntarily dismissed with prejudice on the ground that the plaintiff failed to properly effect service of summons within the time allowed by ORS 12.020 and the statute of limitations for the action expired, the plaintiff may commence a new action based on the same claim or claims against a de- fendant in the original action if the defend ant had actual notice of the ling of the original action not later than 60 days after the action was led. (2) If, pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, a new action is commenced in the manner provided by ORS 12.020 not later than 180 days after the judgment dismissing the original action is entered in the register of the court, the new action is not subject to dismissal by reason of not having been oom- menced within the time allowed by statute. Title 2 Page 212 PROCEDURE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS (3) A new action may be commenced only once under this section for the same claim or claims. (4) All defenses that would have been available if the original action had been commenced within the 'time otherwise al- lowed by statute shall be available in a new action commenced under this section. [Amended by 1961 c726 397; 2003 c296 l] 12.230 Acknowledgment or promise taking contract case out of statute; effect of pa ent. No acknowledgment or promise shall e sufcient evidence of a new or con- tinuing contract, whereby to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained in some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby; but this section shall not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest. 12.240 Effect of payment after obli- gation becomes due. Whenever any pay- ment of principal or interest is made after it has become due, upon an existing contract, whether it is a bill of exchange, promissory note, bond, or other evidence of indebtedness, the limitation shall commence from the time the last payment was made. 12.250 Actions by state, county or public corporations. Unless otherwise made applicable thereto, the limitations prescribed in this chapter shall not apply to actions ~ brought in the name of the state, or any county, or other public corporation therein, or for its benet. 12.260 [Repealed by 1987 c536 91 12.270 Conclusive presumption of va- lidity of governmental subdivision boundary proceedings one year after ef- fective date. On September 13, 1975, any proceeding that establishes or alters the boundaries of a governmental subdivision previously or hereafter initiated and pur- ported to be effected in accordance with ap plicable legal requirements shall be conclusively presumed valid for all purposes one year after the purported effective date of the action. No direct or collateral attack on the action may thereafter be commenced. This statute of limitations includes but is not limited to the following proceedings: (1) Formations and change of organiza- tions under ORS 198.705 to 198.955. (2) Boundary changes under ORS 199.410 to 199.519. (3) Consolidations under ORS 0199.705 to 199.795. (4) Incorporations under ORS 221.010 to 221.090. (5) Annexations under ORS 222.111 to 222.180, 222.750 and 222.840 to 222.915. (2017 Edition) 19.205 PROCEDURE 1N CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 19.180 [1959 0.558 23; 1969 c.1923 48'; renumbered 19.435 in 1997] 19.190 [1959 0.558 26 (enacted in lieu of 19.150); 1969 0.198 49; 1981 0.178 1; 1985 0.540 27; 1985 (2.734 12;711987 0.586 11; 1997 c.71 16; renumbered 19.450 in 199 - 19.200 [1979 c284 58g renumbered 19.430 in 1997] APPEALABLE JUDGMENTS (Generally) 19.205 Appealable judgments and or- ders. (1) Unless otherwise provided by law, a limited judgment, general judgment or supplemental judgment, as those terms are dened by ORS 18.005, may be appealed as provided in this chapter. A judgment cor rected under ORCP 71 may be appealed only as provided in ORS 18.107 and 18.112. (2) An order in an action that affects a substantial right, and that effectively deter- mines the action so as to prevent a judgment in the action, may be a pealed in the same manner as provided in t 's chapter for judg- ments. (3) An order that is made in the action after a general judgment is entered and that affects a substantial right, including an order granting a new trial, may be appealed in the same manner as provided in this chapter for judgments. ' (4) No appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be taken or allowed in any action for the recovery of money or damages only un- less it appears from the pleadings that the amount in controversy exceeds $250. (5) An appeal may be taken from the cir- cuit court in any special statutory proceed ing under the same conditions, in the same manner and with like effect as from a judg- ment or order entered in an action, unless alppeal is expressly prohibited by the law au- t orizing the special statutory proceeding. (6) Nothing in ORS chapter 18 affects the authority of an appellate court to dismiss an appeal or to remand a proceeding to the trial court under ORS 19.270 (4) based on the ap- pellate court's determination that the appeal has not been taken from an appealable judg- ment or order. [Formerly 19.010; 2003 c576 851 19.210 [1981 0.550 2; 1997 c.389 3; renumbered 19.405 in 1997] (Class Actions) 19.215 Determining amount in contro- versy in class action for purposes of ap- peal. The aggregate amount of the claims of all otential class members in a class action un er ORCP 32 shall determine Whether the amount in controversy is sufcient to satisfy the provisions of ORS 19.205 (4) for the pur- oses of any appeal to the Court of Appeals. ormerly 19.013; 2003 c576 573l Title 2 Page 340 19.220 [1981 c.897 107; renumbered 19.440 in 1997] 19.225 Appealability of certain orders in class actions. When a circuit court judge, in making in a class action under ORCP 32 an order not otherwise appealable, is of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin- ion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the judge shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may, thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order to the Court of Appeals if application is made to the court within 10 days after the entry of the order. Application for such an ' appeal shall not stay proceedings in the cir- cuit court unless the circuit court judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall SO order. [Formerly 19.015]. 19.230 [1987 (1.793 1; 1991 6.817 17; 1995 6.595 20; renumbered 34.102 in 1997] (Determining Whether Judgment Appealable) 19.235 Jurisdiction for determining Whether decision is appealable. (1) Not- withstanding ORS 19.270, if any party or the trial court on its own motion, on receiving actual notice of the ling of the notice of appeal, raises the issue whether the decision being appealed is appealable, the trial court shall have jurisdiction to make a summary determination, with or without a hearing, Whether the decision is appealable. As used in this section, \"decision\" means any trial court ruling, either oral or written. (2) If the trial court determines that the decision is not appealable, the trial court, in its discretion, may proceed through entry of judgment or stay proceedings pending an ap- pellate court determination of the existence of an appealable decision. The trial court may refer the question of the existence of an appealable decision to the court to which the appeal is taken. Neither an order by the trial court to proceed through entry of judg- ment, an order by the trial court to stay proceedings pending an appellate court de- termination, nor a trial court referral of the question of the existence of an appealable decision to the appellate court is appealable. However, on motion of any party or on its own motion the appellate court may stay proceedings in the trial court or stay any order or judgment entered by the trial court pending a nal determination of appealability. (3) When a party by motion, the trial court by referral or the appellate court on its own motion raises the issue Whether the de- cision is appealable, the appellate court may (2017 Edition) 41:11:42;;Z.;W'4.m;..:r..;'rr' . .:;:;,e!...z'. APPEALS 19.250 make a summary determination of the appealability of the decision. A summary de- termination of the appealability of a decision under this subsection is subject to review by the Supreme Court as provided in ORS 2.520 except that the petition for review shall be served and led within 14 days after the date of the court's determination. Either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court may shorten the time period within which the petition for review shall be led. Arpetition for review of a determination under this subsectiOn shall not be treated as a request for reconsideration by the Court of Appeals The Supreme Court shall expedite its review of the Court of Appeals' summary determi nation under this subsection. (4)(a) The trial court's authority to pro- ceed with a case under subsection (2) of this section shall end when the appellate court has made an express determination that an ap eal has been taken from an appealable or er or judgment, all means for obtaining review of that determination under subsec tion (3) of this section have been exhausted, and the State Court Administrator at the di- rection of the court has mailed copies of the nal appellate court determination to the trial court and the parties; otherwise, the trial court's jurisdiction shall continue. (b) No action by the trial court taken pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) of this section, except for entry of judgment, shall be void solely because an appellate court later determines that a notice of appeal was led from an appealable decision. [Formerly 19.034] COMMENCING AN APPEAL (Generally) 19.240 How appeal to Court of Appeals taken. (1) An appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be taken in the manner prescribed in this chapter. (2) The appeal shall be taken by causing a notice of appeal, in the form prescribed by ORS 19.250, to be served: (a) On all parties who have appeared in the action, suit or proceeding; (b) On the trial court administrator; and (c) On the trial court transcript coordi- nator if a transcript is designated in con- nection with the appeal. (3) The original of the notice with proof of service indorsed thereon or afxed thereto shall be led with the Court of Appeals. [Formerly 19.023; 1999 c.367 2] 19.245 Who may appeal; appeal of de- fault judgments and judgments taken by confession; appeal of stipulated judg- ments. (1) Except as provided in subsections Title 2 Page 341 (2) and (3) of this section, any party to a Judgment may appeal from the judgment. (2) A party to a judgment given by con- fession or for want of an answer may not appeal from the judgment except as follows: (a) A plaintiff, third party plaintiff or a party who pleaded a cross-claim or counter claim may appeal from the judgment if the judgment is not in accord with the relief de- manded in the complaint. (b) A defendant may appeal from the judgment if the trial court has entered a de- fault judgment against the defendant as a sanction or has denied a motion to set aside a default order or judgment. (c) A defendant may appeal from the judgment if it is void. (3) A party to a stipulated judgment may appeal from the judgment only if: (a) The judgment specically provides that the party has reserved the right to ap pellate review of a ruling of the trial court in the cause; and (b) The appeal presents a justiciable con grloversy. [Formerly 19.020; 1999 c.367 1; 2001 c541 1 (Notice of Appeal) 19.250 Contents of notice of appeal. (1) The notice of appeal must contain the fol- lowing: (a) The title of the cause. The party ap- pealing a judgment must be designated the appellant and the adverse party the respond- ent, but the title of the action or proceeding is not otherwise changed by reason of the appeal. ' (b) The names of the parties and their attorneys. (c)(A) If an appellant is not represented by an attorney, a postal address for the appellant and either an electronic mail ad- dress for the appellant or a statement that the appellant does not have an electronic mail address. (B) If the appellant is represented by an attorney, a postal address and electronic mail address for the attorney. ((1) A notice to each party that appeared in the action or proceeding, or to the attor- ney for the party, that an appeal is taken from the judgment or some specied part of the judgment and designating the adverse parties to the appeal. The notice of appeal must contain the postal address and elec tronic mail address, if known to the appellant, for all other parties designated as parties to the appeal. (e) A designation of those portions of the proceedings and exhibits to be included in (2017 Edition) 19.255 PROCEDURE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS the record in addition to the trial court le. The appellant may amend the designation of record at any time after ling the notice of appeal until 35 days after the ling of a cer- ticate of preparation for the transcript un der ORS 19.370 (3). The amendment must be made by ling and serving in the same man- ner as a notice of appeal a notice of amended designation of record. The amended desig- nation must clearly indicate those portions of the proceedings and exhibits being added to or deleted from the original designation of record. The designation may not be later amended by the appellant unless the appel- late court so orders. (f) A plain and concise statement of the points on which the appellant intends to rely. On appeal, the appellant may rely on no other points than those set forth in such statement. If the appellant has designated for inclusion in the record all the testimony and all the instructions given and requested, no statement of points is necessary. Not later than the 15th day following the ling of the certicate of preparation for the transcript under ORS 19.370 (3), the appellant may serve and le an amended statement of points. Except by approval of the court, the appellant may then rely on no other points than those set forth in such amended state- ment. ' (g) The signature of the appellant or at- torney for the appellant. (2) Within 14 days after the ling of the notice of appeal or amended designation of record, any other party may serve and le a designation of additional parts of the pro- ceedings and exhibits to be included in the record. Such designation must be served and led as provided for the serving and ling of a notice of appeal under ORS 19.240 and 19.260. If such party also appeals, the desig- nation must be included in the notice of ap- peal of the party and may not be served and led separately. [Formerly 19.029; 1999 c367 3; 2013 (2685 41 19.255 Time for service and ling of notice of appeal. (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a no tice of appeal must be served and led within 30 days after the judgment appealed from is entered in the register. (2) If a motion for a new trial is led and served within the time allowed by ORCP 64, or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is led and served within the time allowed by ORCP 63, a notice of appeal must be served and led: (a) Within 30 days after the order dispos ing of the motion is entered in the register, or Within 30 days after the motion is deemed denied under ORCP 63 D or 64 F, whichever is rst; or Title 2 Page 342 (b) Within the time allowed by subsection (1) of this sectiOn, if the period of time pro- vided for in subsection (1) of this section ex- pires later than the period of time provided for in paragraph (a) of this subsection. (3) Any other party who has appeared in the action, suit or proceeding, desiring to appeal against the appellant or any other party to the action, suit or proceeding, may serve and le notice of appeal within 10 days after the expiration of the time allowed by subsections (1) and (2) of this section. Any party not an appellant or respondent, but who becomes an adverse party to a cross ap peal, may cross appeal against any party to he fappeal by a written statement in the me . (4) Except as otherwise ordered by the appellate court, when more than one notice of appeal is led, the date on which the last such notice was led shall be used in deter- mining the time for preparation of the tran- script, ling briefs and other steps in connection with the appeal. [Formerly 19.026; 2003 c281 1] 19.260 Filing by mail or delivery. (1)(a) Filing a notice of appeal in the Court of Ap- peals or the Supreme Court may be accom- plished by mail or delivery. Regardless of the date of actual receipt by the court to which the appeal is taken, the date of ling the notice is the date of mailing or dispatch for delivery, if the notice is: (A) Mailed by registered or certied mail and the party ling the notice has roof from the United States Postal Service 0 the mail- ing date; or (B) Mailed or dispatched via the United States Postal Service or a commercial deliv- ery service by a class of delivery calculated to achieve delivery within three calendar days, and the party ling the notice has proof from the United States Postal Service or the commercial delivery service of the mailing or dispatch date. (b) Proof of the date of mailing or dis- patch under this subsection must be certied by the party ling the notice and led thereafter with the court to which the appeal is taken. Any record of mailing or dispatch from the United States Postal Service or the commercial delivery service showing the date that the party initiated mailing or dispatch is sufcient proof of the date of mailing Or dispatch. If the notice is received by the court on or before the date by which the no- tice is required to be led, the party ling the notice is not required to file proof of mailing or dispatch. (2)(a) Service of notice of appeal on a party, transcript coordinator or the trial court administrator, or service of a petition (2017 Edition) APPEALS for judicial review on a party or administra- tive agency may be accomplished by: (A) First class, registered or certied mail; or (B) Mail or dispatch for delivery via the United States Postal Service or a commercial delivery service by a class of delivery calcu- lated to achieve delivery within three calen- dar days. (b) The date of serving the notice under this subsection is the date of mailing or dis- patch. The party ling the notice must cer tify the date and method of service. (3) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2) of this section, if the party ling a notice of appeal is involuntarily conned in a state or local governmental facility, the date of ling of a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and the date of service under subsection (2) of this sec- tion, is the date on which the party delivers the original notice of appeal, and the appro- priate number of copies of the notice for service under subsection (2) of this section, to the person or place designated by the fa- cility for handling outgoing mail. (4) Except as otherwise provided by law, the provisions of this section are applicable to petitions for judicial review, cross pe- titions for judicial review and petitions under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. [Formerly 19.028; 1999 c367 6; 2011 c310 1; 2015 0.80 1] 19.265 Payment of ling fee. At the time the notice of appeal is led as provided in ORS 19.240, the appellant shall deposit with the State Court Administrator the amount of the appropriate ling fee. The timely deposit of such fee is not jurisdic tional, but omission to do so shall be cause for dismissal of the appeal, subject to the provisions of ORS 19.270 (3). [Formerly 19.035] (Jurisdiction of Appellate Court and Trial Court) 19.270 Appellate jurisdiction of Su- preme Court and Court of Appeals; trial court jurisdiction to enter appealable judgment or order. (1) The Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the cause when the notice of appeal has been served and led as provided in ORS 19.240, 19.250 and 19.255. The trial court may exer cise those powers in connection with the ap- peal as are conferred by law, and retains jurisdiction in the matter for the following purposes: (a) Deciding requests for attorney fees, costs and disbursements or expenses pursu ant to ORCP 68 or other provision of law. Title 2 Page 343 19.270 (b) Enforcing the judgment, subject to any stay of the judgment. (c) Deciding a motion for judgment not- withstanding the verdict under ORCP 63. (d) Deciding a motion for new trial under ORCP 64. (e) Deciding a motion for relief from judgment under ORCP 71 B. (2) The following requirements of ORS 19.240, 19.250 and 19.255 are jurisdictional and may not be waived or extended: (a) Service of the notice of appeal on all parties identied in the notice of appeal as adverse parties or, if the notice of appeal does not identify adverse parties, on all par- ties who have appeared in the action, suit or proceeding, as provided in ORS 19.240 (2)(a), within the time limits prescribed by ORS 19.255. (b) Filing of the original of the notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals as provided in ORS 19.240 (3), within the time limits prescribed by ORS 19.255. (3) After the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has acquired jurisdiction of the cause, the omission of a party to perform any of the acts required in connection with an appeal, or to perform such acts within the time required, shall be cause for dismissal of the appeal. In the event of such omission, the court, on motion of a party or on its own motion may dismiss the appeal. An appeal dismissed on a party's motion or on the court's own motion may be reinstated upon showing of good cause. (4) Notwithstanding the ling of a notice of appeal, the trial court has jurisdiction, with leave of the appellate court, to enter an appealable judgment or order if the appellate court determines that: (a) At the time of the ling of the notice of appeal the trial court intended to enter an appealable judgment or order; and (b) The judgment or order from which the appeal is taken is defective in form or was entered at a time when the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the cause under sub- section (1) of this section, or the trial court had not yet entered an appealable judgment or order. (5) Notwithstanding the ling of a notice of appeal, the trial court has jurisdiction: (a) To enter in the trial court register a judgment or order that the trial judge signed before the notice of appeal was led; (b) To enter an order or supplemental judgment under ORCP 71 or ORS 19.275, 107.105 (4) or 107.452; and (2017 Edition)