I am attaching an case study. Based on which please answer the following.

On September 2015, a project was supposed to take the SS El Faro from Jacksonville, Florida and end in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The project ended in a devastating failure.

I need help in writing an essay on how the risks were managed in this project as described in the Case Study. analysis must be structured according to the risk management life cycle. Consider

• Risk communication, leadership and language of the team
• Characteristics of the project SRMP that influenced the risk management
• Uncertainty, Signal and risk identification and management
• Use of qualitative and quantitative risk analysis.
• Methods used for responding, monitoring and controlling the risks.

Include:

• your own analysis on the project risk management theories
• supported by valid examples on how it was applied in this Case Study

CASE STUDY 10: SS El Faromeets Joaquin

Tuesday, September 29, 2015

SS El Faro's main line of business was the run the 2100 km stretch between Jacksonville and San Juan, Puerto Rico.That night, she was already late taking in a full cargo. The ship was supposed to leave by 19:00 EDT but she departed

Jacksonville, Florida, at 20:06. Although it was hurricane season, the Florida waters were calm. El Farowas crewed by a toughened American and Polish crew with a "can-do" attitude. They were confidentof following a planned, familiar route as they had done many times before.

At this same time, a tropical storm was slowly moving in down the Atlantic. Charles Baird, an off-duty second mate from El-Farotexted Captain Michael Davidson to ask him if he would be changing his route. The Captain had already heard about this impending storm and, buoyed by his experience in these waters, decided that he was going to ignore the risk. "We'll steam our normal direct route to SJP. No real weather to speak of until the evening of the 30^th. All forecasted information indicates Joaquin will remain north of us and by the morning of the 01^st we will be on the backside of her",he texted, at 17:58 "We are scheduled to depart the dock at 2000 tonight. So, everything is shaping up in our favour".

Baird responded with a reminder with several detours that Davidson should consider.

Davidson texted back that the Sox baseball team are up 1-0 over NY. Davidson new the game scores but little did he know that a storm was taking a bee-line trajectory to intersect with his trip.

This was the storm Joaquin. Within days, Joaquin would spin El Farolike a toy and sink her, broken into the Atlantic, killing all 33 of the crew.

Wednesday September 30

As the sun rose over the Atlantic, El Farowas moving southeast on its tried and true trek towards the US Islands. Meteorologist upgraded tropical storm Joaquin to Category 2. Captain Davidson at the bridge became aware that the storm was upgraded but he decided to accept the menace. He had reasons for taking the most direct route to San Juan. An alternate route would be to follow the Florida coastline, run behind the Bahama Shallows, and then past Cuba to Puerto Rico. But a detour from the straight path would have taken the ship an extra 8 hoursto reach San Juan.

The Captain, a master mariner with 10 years under his belt, knew from past weather data that these tropical storms would hit the Bahaman land mass and turn north into the US Eastern seaboard, reducing in strength as it moved. Based on this pattern, he assumed that El Farowould only feel the tail endbreeze as Joaquin's fury diminished. The only question was: when will Joaquin make that turn? Will it turn before he made it to the Bahamas? By noon, meteorology readings showed that Joaquin had been upgraded to a Category 3 hurricane.

The Captain did not seek advice from any of his officers. Although he knew that there was a Category 3 threat, he did not know much else. By 07:02 EDT, El Farowas at a point of no turning (see decision 1 on the map). It had to go down and meet Joaquin, hopefully at its more peaceful tail.

The Captain was highly experienced in this route having made this haul, back and forth many times. He had used the same crew and they worked hard for the end-of-trip payout. Unlike a taxi, these ships do not get paid going up and down the Atlantic: they get paid only on reaching the destination with theload. There was another reason for his decision to stay the course: his shipping company had recently undergone a re-organization: two captains were to replace the original three and the captain had to prove his worth. The captain and crew had this "Don't think, Get'er Done" attitude.

Voice recordings from the bridge showed that the captain discussed the threat (not the decision) with the Chief Mate Steve Shultz. This ended with a dictated decision from the Captain "So we'll have totough this one out". No supporting evidence was provided, except thatit was a command.

When the captain's shift ended, the voice recording noted that he said "We're good"providing an opinion, not an analysis. "Oh no, we're not gunna turn around! We're gunna be fine".He even mocked the novice mariners on deck for being afraid of every weather pattern data. This was the coercion language of determined invincibility, or power from the Master. At 20:00, the Captain retired to his quarters telling the third mate, to call him if the situation worsened. The situation worsened. At 21:05 the voice data recording shows that the Captain was told of the terror visible from the bridge. When the call ended, the third mate recorded that he was to stay the course. He obeyed without question.

Thursday October 1

At midnight the shift changed, Second Mate Danielle Randolph came on the bridge; she could see the storm and the ship started taking in water on the deck. Data recorders noted: "I can't win. Every time we turn further south, the storm keeps trying to follow us".

Indeed, the meteorological records show that Joaquin was getting ready for the final massive punch; it moved to a Category 4 hurricane with fierce winds up to 220 km/h. Several crew members were uncomfortable. Joaquin did not turn north; it was determined to meet SS El Faro.Randolph called the Captain to report the situation: El Farowas very vulnerable. They were aware of an escape route (see decision 2) of deep waters that may take the ship to shelter them behind the Turks and Caicos. Randolph started taking the ship south to safety. Her decision was reversed by the Captain. Comments made by the Randolph to the helmsman on the bridge indicated that the Captain asked her to stay the original course. When Randolph got off the phone with him, she said to helmsman Davis, "He said to run it." She meantthe course as planned. "Hold on to your A**!,", she said and laughed.

The Captain's assumption of meeting the tail of the storm had long since been proven wrong; in fact, he ordered the bridge to increase speed in order to by-pass the eye of the hurricane. At 01:55 the strength of the waves started weighing down on the ship's steam power plant and it was apparent that she could not keep up.

At 03:45, Chief Mate Steve Shultz arrived to take over the bridge. The Captain came up at 04:00. He said,"There's nothing bad about this ride. I was sleepin' like a baby."

Schultz disagreed and said, "Not me."

Davidson said, "What? Who's not sleeping good? Well, this is every day in Alaska. This is what it's like."

Schultz said, "That's what I said when I walked up here. I said this is every day in Alaska."

Like Captain Davidson, both Shultz and Randolph were highly experienced, well trained and respected mariners. Although their relationship was professional, text messages dated October 2015, from Randolph to her mother showed that Davidson did not involve them in his leadership decisions.Randolph, at 34, had graduated in 2004 from Maine Maritime Academy and received her bachelor's degree in marine transportation.

Visibility was zero. Various alarms from below deck and the engine room indicated that the ship was taking in water and some of the cargo was either destroyed, or worse, already overboard. Randolph came up to assist the Captain and the First mate.

At 06:13, El Faro'spower plant gave up. There was silence in the engine room. The propulsion had stopped. Although the backup power kicked in, El Far was at nature's mercy. Joaquim now started spinning the ship around in synch with the wind. A general alarm rang out and the Captain ordered all hands to abandon ship. It was too late to execute that order.

At 07:35 after spinning aimlessly near the eye, El Farodisappeared into the Atlantic with the crew.