(i) Define which player moves first, which second.

(Identify which are the two players and what are there two strategies.) (ii) Assign payoffs to all terminal nodes to define a game in the extensive form.

(Draw game theory game tree. Also use prisoner's dilemma table format {include the numbers})

The task is to find all subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the game that you defined. Then, find out if the game that you defined has a Nash equilibrium, which is not a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. If there is such an equilibrium, try to interpret the meaning of this equilibrium in light of the article.

• In the article, the author discusses how the Iranian regime has been using a zero-sum approach to nuclear talks. The regime believes that if it can get a better deal for itself, then it will be able to improve its position in the world. This strategy doesn't take other countries' interests into account. This can lead to problems down the road, as other countries may not be willing to make concessions if they feel like they're being taken advantage of.
• The set of players in this situation are the Iranian regime and the other countries involved in nuclear talks. The strategies are to either continue using a zero-sum approach or to try and find a compromise that takes into account the interests of all parties involved.
• It is plausible to consider this situation as a zero-sum game because both sides are trying to get the best possible deal for themselves. Each side is trying to minimize their losses and maximize their gains, which means that there is no room for cooperation or compromise.
• In this game, both sides would prefer to find a compromise than continue using a zero-sum approach. However, each side is also trying to minimize their losses, which means that neither side will want to make the first move. This could lead to a stalemate, where both sides are unwilling to budge and no progress is made.

The payoffs in this game would be as follows:

• If the Iranian regime continues using a zero-sum approach, it may be able to get a better deal for itself in the short run. However, other countries will eventually catch on and they will be less likely to make concessions in future talks. This could lead to a breakdown in negotiations and an escalation of tensions. The payoff for the Iranian regime would be -1.
• If the other countries involved in the talks continue using a zero-sum approach, they will be able to get better deals for themselves in the short run. However, this will not last forever as the Iranian regime will eventually catch on. This could lead to a breakdown in negotiations and an escalation of tensions. The payoff for the other countries would be -1.
• If both sides find a compromise, they will be able to come to an agreement that is mutually beneficial. Both sides will make concessions, but these concessions will be offset by gains elsewhere. This could lead to a long-term peace between both sides and allow them to work together towards common goals. The payoff for both sides would be 1.

The Nash equilibria in this game are as follows:

• If the Iranian regime continues using a zero-sum approach, it may be able to get a better deal for itself in the short run. However, other countries will eventually catch on and they will be less likely to make concessions in future talks. This could lead to a breakdown in negotiations and an escalation of tensions. The payoff for the Iranian regime would be -1.
• If the other countries involved in the talks continue using a zero-sum approach, they will be able to get better deals for themselves in the short run. However, this will not last forever as the Iranian regime will eventually catch on. This could lead to a breakdown in negotiations and an escalation of tensions. The payoff for the other countries would be -1.