I have already answered part a, but i need help with parts b thru d in the following screenshotted question.

Consider the following game between Rowena and Colin COLIN L M N R ROWENA U 1, 1 2, 2 3, 4 9, 3 D 2, 5 3, 3 1, 2 7, 1 (a) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game above. (b) Let p denote the probability that Rowena plays U. Find Colin's expected payoffs EU from playing each of his pure strategies as a function of p. Graph the expected payoffs on a p-EU plane. When finding a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, do you think that Colin will use all of the pure strategies in the mixture? Explain. (c) Let q denote the probability that Colin plays L. Find a mixed-strategy Nash equi- librium of this game. What are the players' expected payoffs in the equilibrium? (d) If possible, graph the best responses of Rowena and Colin on a p-q coordinate plane. Label all Nash equilibria