I have asked this question yesterday together 3 other question and did not receive a feedback. Please help me with the beliow:

Two siblings, Bratty Brenda and Tattling Tina are playing a simultaneous hit and tell game. Bratty Brenda can hit Tattling Tina or not and Tattling Tina can tattle on Bratty Brenda or not. Relative to no hitting and no tattling, if Bratty Brenda hits Tattling Tina, and she tattles they both experience a loss of 10. Not telling, gets Tattling Tina a bruise, a loss of 5 but Bratty Brenda gains 5. If she tattles untruthfully, Tattling Tina gets a gain of 5 and Bratty Brenda loses 5. If they get along, no one gets anything

What would be the Nash equilibrium of this simultaneous game?

a. Hit, Tell

b. Not hit, Tell

c. Hit, Not tell

d. Both B&C

Under the non-strategic view of bargaining, the terms of agreement are determined by

a. Your opponent's outside options

b. Your outside options

c. Your opponents gain from agreement

d. All of the above