I have chegg subscription and can see all answers available. Kindly do not copy paste otherwise I will give a thumbs down as it wastes my question. I doubt that the answer already available is wrong.

Please answer the question below and zoom in the image. It is perfectly visible.

II - A Managerial problem II Anika is hired by the owner of a kitchen supply store to manage the store. Anika and the owner are both risk-neutral. The probability of weak demand is 0.2, and the probability of strong demand is 0.8. Each cell in the following table shows the store's profit from a specific combination of demand and Anika's managerial effort. Anika's cost of effort is not subtracted from these profits. This effort cost is 2 for low effort, 10 for medium, and 32 for high Weak Demand Strong Demand 60 40 Low Effort 60 100 Medium Effort 100 140 High Effort Create a spreadsheet containing this information Add a column showing Anika's cost of effort and also add columns for the expected payoff to Anika and the owner. a. Fill in the expected payoffs to both parties if Anika is compensated with a profit-sharing contract providing her with 50% of the profits (and the owner gets the other 509). Which effort level does Anika choose? b. Now suppose that Anika's contract provides her with a base salary of 30 and 100% of any profits exceeding 100. Which effortleve does she choose? c. Which of the two contracts in parts a, and b. would Anika prefer? Which would the owner prefer