I need a thorough answer to the following question regarding the attached Coors Balanced Scorecard Case Study:

Perform an economic value added (EVA) analysis to assess its potential as a balanced scorecard (BSC) financial performance measure for Coors. Should EVA become part of Coors BSC?

ISSN 1940-204X COORS BALANCED SCORECARD: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE sh is ar stu ed d vi y re aC s o ou urc rs e eH w er as o. co m Hugh Grove University of Denver Tom Cook University of Denver Ken Richter Coors Brewing Company Introduction that provided the financial and materials planning software modules. The SAP planning software became Coors load configurator software that takes distributor demand forecasts and the production schedule and creates a shipping schedule for the following week. The following major supply chain problems were corrected by this CIL project: By the end of 1997, Coors had finished the implementation of a three-year Computer Integrated Logistics (CIL) project to improve its supply chain management. Coors defined its supply chain as every activity involved in moving production from the supplier's supplier to the customer's customer. (Since by Federal law, Coors cannot sell directly to consumers, Coors customers are its distributors whose customers are retailers whose customers are consumers.) Coors supply chain included the following processes: purchasing, research and development, engineering, brewing, conditioning, fermenting, packaging, warehouse, logistics, and transportation. This CIL project was a cross-functional initiative to reengineer the business processes by which Coors logistics or supply chain was managed. This reengineering project improved supply chain processes and applied information technology to provide timely and accurate information to those involved in supply chain management. The project objective was to increase company profitability by reducing cycle times and operating costs and increasing customer (distributor) satisfaction. The software vendor used for this project was the German company, Systems Applications & Products (SAP), 1. meeting seasonal demand, 2. meeting demand surges from sales promotions, 3.\t\u0007supporting the introduction of more than three new Th brands each year, 4. filling routine customer (distributor) orders, 5. filling rush orders, and 6.\t\u0007moving beer from production through warehouse to distributors before the beer spoiled. (The shelf lives for Coors products were 60 days for beer kegs and 112 days for all other beer packages.) IM A EDUCATIONA L CA S E JOURNAL https://www.coursehero.com/file/11671258/Coors-Case/ Matt Vail, head of Coors Customer Service department, had been the CIL project leader since the inception of this project. He had developed such expertise with supply chain management that he had just been hired by a supply chain, consulting firm. In early 1998 on his last day of work for Coors, he was talking with Ken Rider, head of Coors Quality Assurance Department. 1 VOL. 1, N O. 1, ART. 5, MARCH 2008 to use the following crisis motivation. At that time, Coors could not support all the new beer brand introductions proposed by our marketing people, due to the antiquated 1970's software that was then being used for our supply chain management. The marketing people wanted to introduce three new brands each quarter and we could only support three new brands each year! We also learned that we needed to get more employee involvement in the project. Ken: That's a good idea. In fact, I have already developed a list of the most frequently asked questions (FAQ's) about the balanced scorecard from initial meetings with employees involved in the supply chain. Matt: You have lots of challenges awaiting you. Good luck in your new project. Make sure that today's improvements in supply chain performance don't become tomorrow's problems! sh is ar stu ed d vi y re aC s o ou urc rs e eH w er as o. co m Ken had just been placed in charge of the new balanced scorecard (BSC) project at Coors. The initial motivation for this project was to assess whether the supply chain improvements were being maintained. However, the project was broadened to become a company-wide BSC. Accordingly, the project strategy was to implement a performance measurement process that: 1) focused upon continuous improvement, 2) rewarded reasonable risk taking and learning to improve performance and 3) enabled employees to understand the opportunity and reward for working productively. Matt: The supply chain management project was really challenging and rewarding. I hate to leave Coors but the consulting firm made me such an attractive offer that I could not refuse it. I hope you have such positive experiences with this follow-up balanced scorecard project. Ken: This new project will be a real challenge. We need to build upon all the improvements made by your supply chain project. Matt: My project team was excited to see that our CEO discussed the supply chain project in his 1997 shareholder letter. He said that significant productivity gains in 1997 were due to our project that streamlined purchasing, brewing, packaging, transportation, and administration of the supply chain. Ken: Perhaps an economic value added (EVA) analysis could be done to assess these supply chain productivity gains. Matt: That's an interesting idea to analyze performance in the financial quadrant of the balanced scorecard with EVA. Ken: Another challenge for my project is how to translate the Coors vision statement and related business strategies into operational performance measures. Matt: You also need to identify any gaps between the vision statement, business strategies, and current performance. Ken: Do you have any experiences from your project that I could use? Matt: Well, we did obtain some benchmarking data to develop targets for some performance measures for our supply chain project. I can give you these measures but they are limited due to confidentiality problems in obtaining such data. Maybe Coors should join one of the commercial benchmarking databases. Ken: Thanks. I am also aware of certain employee resistance to developing a new set of performance measures for this balanced scorecard approach. Matt: We had similar employee resistance to changes in the business processes of the supply chain. We were able Balanced Scorecard Background Th The balanced scorecard is a set of financial and non-financial measures relating to the company's mission, strategies, and critical success factors. The balanced scorecard puts vision and strategy at the center of the management control system. Vision and strategy drive performance measures, as opposed to the traditional performance measurement systems that provided their own, limited measures to management whether they were needed or not. The goal is to maintain an alignment among an organization's vision, strategy, programs, measurements, and rewards. An innovative aspect is that the components of the scorecard are designed in an integrative manner to reinforce each other as indicators of both current and future prospects for the company. The balanced scorecard enables management to measure key drivers of overall performance, rather than focusing on short-term, financial results. It helps management stay focused on the entire business process and helps ensure that actual current operating performance is in line with long-term strategy. Kaplan and Norton (1992) are generally given credit for creating the balanced scorecard in the early 1990's. One survey found that found that 60% of the Fortune 1,000 companies have or are experimenting with a balanced scorecard (Silk 1998). Such changes have been driven by the evolving focus on a team-based, process-oriented management control system. There are four perspectives or quadrants in the balanced scorecard that generate performance measures to assess the progress of a company's vision and strategy as follows: IM A EDUCATIONA L CA S E JOURNAL https://www.coursehero.com/file/11671258/Coors-Case/ 2 VOL. 1, N O. 1, ART. 5, MARCH 2008 1. Customer perspective: how do customers see us? In the mid-1970's Coors was a regional brewery with an eleven-state market, selling one brand in a limited number of packages through approximately two hundred distributors. Traditionally, Coors beer had been a non-pasteurized, premium beer. (However, with a recently developed sterilization process, its products now have the same shelf life as its competitors' pasteurized products.) Coors plant in Golden, Colorado was its only production facility and it had no other distribution centers. Over the next 25 years, Coors changed dramatically by expanding into all fifty states and various foreign markets. By the end of the twentieth century, Coors had production facilities in Golden, Colorado, Memphis, Tennessee, Elkton, Virginia, and Zaragoza, Spain. It had expanded to using twenty-one \"satellite redistribution centers\" in the United States before the CIL project reduced this number to eight. Beer shipments were made by both truck and railroad cars. Coors had approximately 650 domestic beer distributors although about 200 of them accounted for 80% of Coors total sales. Coors also had several joint ventures and international distributors in Canada, the Caribbean, Latin American, Europe, and the Pacific. Coors had sixteen beer brands, including a specialty line, Blue Moon that competed with the domestic micro brewing industry.However, Coors continued to focus upon its four key premium brands, Coors Light, Original Coors, Killian's Irish Red, and Zima. Coors Light was the fourth largest selling beer in the U.S. In packaging, Coors had to compete with the major competitors' value packaging, such as twelve-packs and thirty-packs. In 1959, Coors introduced the nation's first all-aluminum beverage can and in the late 1990's, it had introduced a baseball bat bottle and a football pigskin bottle. There were also numerous state labeling laws to meet, such as returnable information, and packaging graphics to reinforce the Rocky Mountains image for Coors beer. 2. Internal business perspective: what must we excel at? 3.\t\u0007Innovation and learning perspective: can we continue to improve and create value? 4. Financial perspective: how do we look to shareholders? sh is ar stu ed d vi y re aC s o ou urc rs e eH w er as o. co m The BSC is a set of discrete, linked measures that gives management a comprehensive and timely evaluation of performance. The BSC tries to minimize information overload by providing a limited number of measures that focus on key business processes by level of management. For example, top management needs summarized, comprehensive monetary measures while lower levels of management and employees may need both monetary and non-monetary measures on a more frequent basis. Also, such measures need to track progress concerning the gap between a company's performance and benchmarked targets. The BSC considers frequency of measurement depending upon the type of measure. Generally, nonmonetary measures are reported more frequently than monetary measures. For example, non-monetary, operating measures, such as machine downtime, percentage of capacity used, and deviations from schedule, may be measured daily. Other non-monetary measures, such as manufacturing cycle time, delivery accuracy, customer complaints, and spoilage, may be measured weekly. Some non-monetary and monetary measures, such as inventory days, accounts receivable days, product returns, and warranty costs, may be measured quarterly. Other non-monetary and monetary measures, such as new products introduced, market share, total cost of poor quality, return on investment and employee training, may be measured annually. Company Background Coors had been a family owned and operated business from its inception in 1873 until 1993 when the first non-family member became President and Chief Operating Officer. However, Coors family members still held the positions of Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer and all voting stock. Only nonvoting, Class B common stock was publicly traded. Coors has been financed primarily by equity and has only borrowed capital twice in its corporate history. The first long-term debt, $220 million, 8.5% notes, was issued in 1991 and the final $40 million of principal will be repaid by the end of 1999. The second long-term debt, $100 million, 7% unsecured notes, was issued in a 1995 private placement. $80 million of this principal is due in 2002 and the last $20 million is due in 2005. Th Competition IM A EDUCATIONA L CA S E JOURNAL https://www.coursehero.com/file/11671258/Coors-Case/ Competition in the beer industry was strong, especially in the United States. Anheuser-Busch (A/B) was the market leader with approximately 50% of the U.S. market, 80 million barrels sold, $8 billion beer sales and $1 billion net profit. Due to its size, A/B was the acknowledged price leader in the industry. A/B also had thirteen domestic production plants, including one in Ft. Collins, Colorado, to achieve its customer service goal of having no major domestic distributor more than 500 miles away from one of its beer production plants. Number two in this market was Miller, owned by Philip Morris, with approximately 20% market share, 40 million 3 VOL. 1, N O. 1, ART. 5, MARCH 2008 fundamentals in the future: 1. \u0007baseline growth: we will profitably grow key brands and key markets, 2. \u0007incremental growth: we will selectively invest to grow high potential markets, channels, demographics, and brands, 3. \u0007product quality: we will continuously elevate consumer perceived quality by improving taste, freshness, package integrity, and package appearance at point of purchase, 4. \u0007distributor service: we will significantly enhance distributor service as measured by improved freshness, less damage, increased on-time arrivals, and accurate order fill at a lower cost to Coors, 5. \u0007productivity gains: we will continuously lower total company costs per barrel so Coors can balance improved profitability, investments to grow volume, market share, and revenues, and funding for the resources needed to drive long-term productivity and success, and 6. \u0007people: we will continuously improve our business performance through engaging and developing our people. sh is ar stu ed d vi y re aC s o ou urc rs e eH w er as o. co m barrels sold, $4 billion beer sales, and $460 million net profit. Miller also had seven domestic production plants. Coors was number three with an 10% market share, 20 million barrels sold, $2 billion beer sales, and $80 million net profit. Coors had three production plants in the United States. Its Colorado plant was the largest brewery in the world and served 70% of the U.S. market with its ten can lines, six bottle lines, and two keg lines. There were no other domestic brewers with market share in excess of 5%. In the late 1990's, there had been consolidation of the larger companies in the domestic beer industry. The most recent example was Stroh Brewing Company (SBC) with about 5% market share. SBC had signed agreements to sell its major brands to Miller and the remaining brands to Pabst Brewing Company and exited the beer industry by 2000. From 1983 through 1998, Coors was the only major U.S. brewer to increase its sales volume each year although industry sales had grown only about 1% per year in the 1990's. Coors had outpaced the industry volume growth rate by one or two percentage points each year. Coors had accomplished this growth by building its key premium brands in key markets and strengthening its distributor network, recently with improved supply chain management. The Operations and Technology (O&T) department of Coors was in charge of the supply chain management and had developed its own vision to elaborate the overall Coors vision statement as follows: We are partners with our internal business stakeholders, with our suppliers and with our communities. With our partners, we have developed an aligned and integrated supply chain that delivers our commitments and meets the requirements that delight our distributors, retailers, and consumers, establishing our company as the supplier of choice. The processes required to design, safely produce, and deliver great tasting beer at its freshest, with superior packaging integrity, competitive cost, are well-defined, understood, consistently followed, and continually improved by every person in our organization. The quality and innovation we employ in all we do encourage beer drinkers to seek out our brands and make Coors the envy of our competition. Our use of current, accurate information and appropriate technology enables all individuals in our organization to monitor and control their work, be flexible and move with speed. We value learning and exercise a tenacious approach to eliminate waste and reduce cost. We realize that in a competitive world, we must bring value to our brands and continually aspire to a higher level of performance to compete successfully. The O&T department had also adopted and extended the following supply chain guiding principles from the work of the CIL supply chain project team to create its own business strategies: Coors Vision Statement and Business Strategies Th Coors Vision Statement was as follows: Our company has a proud history of visionary leadership, quality products and dedicated people which has enabled us to succeed in a highly competitive and regulated industry. We must continue to build on this foundation and become even more effective by aligning and uniting the human, financial and physical aspects of our company to bring great tasting beer, great brands and superior service to our distributors, retailers and consumers and to be a valued neighbor in our communities. Our continued success will require teamwork and an even stronger dedication by every person in our organization to a common purpose, our Vision. Achieving our Vision requires that we begin this journey immediately and with urgency for it will require significant change for us to thrive and win in our industry. Using this vision statement, top management had decided to focus on four fundamentals: improving quality, improving service, boosting profitability, and developing employee skills. In the 1997 Coors annual report, both the CEO and the President discussed the following general business strategies or \"six planks\" to drive these IM A EDUCATIONA L CA S E JOURNAL https://www.coursehero.com/file/11671258/Coors-Case/ 4 VOL. 1, N O. 1, ART. 5, MARCH 2008 1. Simplify and stabilize the process Thus, Ken's project team had already added three new non-monetary performance measures as described below and created challenging performance targets for these measures to track anticipated additional efficiencies from the CIL project. Also, top management had created financial goals for the following key monetary performance measures in an attempt to become more competitive. These key performance measures indicated the following gaps in current performance at the end of 1997: 2. Eliminate non-value added time and waste 3. Relentlessly pursue continuous improvement 4. Inventory is a liability, not an asset 5.\t\u0007People doing the work are critical to lasting improvement 6. Short cycle time + reliability = flexibility 7. Find and fix the root cause 8. Know your costs 9. Know your customers' expectations 10.\tMake decisions where work is performed 11.\tBalance and optimize the overall process 12.\tWhat gets measured gets done Table 2 Key Performance Measures Benchmarking and Performance Gaps CIL Project Performance Measure Pre Only limited benchmarking information was available since Coors had not yet decided to join any of the commercial benchmarking databases. (The largest one in the United States, the Hackett Group Study, sponsored by the American Institute of CPA's, has about 700 participating companies.) Performance gaps with Coors two major competitors were noted by the following financial information obtained from annual reports: sh is ar stu ed d vi y re aC s o ou urc rs e eH w er as o. co m Manufacturing Miller Coors Gap Load Schedule (1) 30% 60% 100% 40% Load Item Accuracy (2) 90% 95% 100% 5% Production Stability (3) 25% 50% 100% 50% Monetary (per barrel) Manufacturing Cost $56 $55 $53 $2 S, G & A Cost $30 $29 $27 $2 $3 $4 $6 $2 Net Profit Notes (these non-monetary performance targets are based upon weekly schedules generated by the supply chain software): (1) Truck or rail car loaded on time: within two hours of scheduled lead time (2) Commitments to distributors: exact product and exact quality (3) Production of scheduled product and quantity: at planned time These performance gaps indicated problems with Coors traditional, cost-based performance measures. For example, direct labor variances were becoming less important due to the highly automated nature of the beer production lines. Also, current performance measures were fragmented and inconsistent between plants, unclear, not linking the separate business processes to the organization goals, not balanced to prevent over emphasis in one area at the expense of another, not actionable at all levels, and used to punish rather than incent continuous improvement. S,G & A\tNet Profit Competitor\tCost per barrel\tCost per barrel Anheuser-Busch Target Non-Monetary Table 1 Benchmarking Analysis Beer Industry Post Performance per barrel $48.00 $27.50 $12.50 $50.00 $27.00 $11.00 $55.00 $29.00 $4.00 Th There were insignificant differences in price per barrel as A/B was the industry price leader and the other competitors closely followed A/B's pricing decisions. A/B had this pricing power since its domestic market share was more than twice that of Miller and more than four times that of Coors. The major motivation for the CIL supply chain project came from the deficiencies in the supply chain performance. The CIL project had become fully operational by the end of 1997 but more time was needed to realize the full benefits of such a project. There was still a significant amount of volatility in the production process that contributed to the Colorado redistribution center being the largest bottleneck in the supply chain. For example, Coors often could not meet its goal to load beer product directly off the production line into waiting railroad cars. IM A EDUCATIONA L CA S E JOURNAL https://www.coursehero.com/file/11671258/Coors-Case/ Balanced Scorecard and Change Management Issues Ken was thinking that he could develop a crisis motivation for his balanced scorecard project, similar to the strategy used by Matt for his CIL project. Ken knew that Coors traditional, cost-based performance measures were not driving desired results as indicated by the various performance gaps. From the vision statement and business strategy analysis, he thought that long-term sustainability and improvement in performance 5 VOL. 1, N O. 1, ART. 5, MARCH 2008 12.\t\u0007How can you hold me responsible for a measure when I could be achieved by linking the balanced scorecard to the annual strategic planning process. He thought that continuous improvement required clearly defined, aligned business process and activity measures that support a BSC. Ken had already had preliminary meetings about this BSC project with employees who were involved in supply chain management. He had developed a list of frequently asked questions (FAQ's). He thought that these FAQ's might help guide him in implementing a balanced scorecard for Coors. These key FAQ's are listed here: am not the only one who can affect it? 13.\t\u0007How often will the scorecard be updated? 14.\tWill the scorecard be used as a club? 15.\tWho will put together this scorecard? Balanced Scorecard Project: Additional Thoughts Ken was wondering whether he should do an EVA analysis to demonstrate its potential for a BSC financial performance measure. Coors net operating profit before income taxes had increased from $75 million in 1996 to $105 million in 1997. According to both the CEO's shareholder letter and a Value Line analysis, the major reason for this increase was the productivity improvement from the supply chain management project that cost $20 million. This $30 million improvement in net operating profit before income taxes was also predicted to become a permanent improvement for both 1998 and 1999 operations. Ken's project team had compiled the following five annual adjustments (all increases) and other financial information just in case Ken decided to do an EVA analysis. 1.\t\u0007Will the balanced scorecard be linked to any incentive sh is ar stu ed d vi y re aC s o ou urc rs e eH w er as o. co m plans? 2.\t\u0007What if a measure does not drive the correct behavior after implementation? What process will be used to evolve the scorecard? How will my input be heard? 3.\t\u0007Won't the measures reduce our ability to be flexible with our distributors and make last minute changes for them? 4.\t\u0007Why is the window on the Load Schedule Performance measure so tight? What difference does it make if we get a load out within plus/minus two hours? If we get it out the day it is scheduled, won't the load arrive at the distributor as planned? 5.\t\u0007We already have plant measures that are working. Why would we want to change them? 6.\t\u0007The Production Stability Measure does not incent the production lines to run ahead. Doesn't it make sense to allow us to run ahead on major brands as a cushion for those times when we have problems? So what should we do when we are more than an hour ahead, shut the line down? 7.\t\u0007Why would you base Production Stability, Load Schedule Performance, and Load Item Accuracy on the initial weekly schedule? The schedule changes constantly. Why measure me against a weekly schedule that has changed as a result of something I had no control over? 8.\t\u0007Will the balanced scorecard be used to compare the performance of the three U.S. plants? Since each plant is different, how can we be expected to use the same scorecard? 9.\t\u0007Product mix can adversely affect the cost per barrel. Will this be taken into consideration in this measure? 10.\t\u0007There may be some important measures excluded from the scorecard. If so, will they eventually be added to the scorecard? 11.\t\u0007Will there be a throughput measure on the scorecard? I cannot affect the number of barrels coming through my plant. That is determined by sales and scheduling that shifts production between plants. Table 3 EVA Adjustments Adjustments (in millions)\tCapital Advertising costs (three year life) $ 900 $300 LIFO reserve 45 3 Deferred income tax liability 65 10 Capitalization of operating leases 30 5 Net interest expense 0 12 At the end of 1997, Coors had total stockholder equity of $730 million and total liabilities of $670 million. Total liabilities included $170 million of interest bearing debt as well as current liabilities, deferred income taxes, and pension liabilities. Coors weighted average cost of capital was 10%. Ken was curious about what gaps might exist between vision statements and current business strategies for both Coors and the O&T department. However, he did not want this gap analysis to wind up overloading the BSC with too many performance measures. He was also concerned about what performance targets and reporting frequencies to establish for various BSC performance measures. Other challenges were how to link BSC performance measures and how to gain employee acceptance of the BSC. Th IM A EDUCATIONA L CA S E JOURNAL https://www.coursehero.com/file/11671258/Coors-Case/ Income 6 VOL. 1, N O. 1, ART. 5, MARCH 2008 Ken realized that he had some serious challenges ahead of him in order to create and implement a balanced scorecard for Coors. It was now January 1998 and top management was pressing for a quick installation of the balanced scorecard in order to use it for evaluating performance in 1998. than 500 miles away from an A/B brewery. SABMiller had nine U.S. beer plants. At the time of the case in 1998, Coors had three U.S. beer plants. Its Golden, Colorado brewery remained the largest one in the world. In 2005 Coors closed its Memphis, Tennessee plant due to continued inefficiencies in brewing Coors non-pasteurized beer. (The Memphis plant was originally purchased from the Stroh's beer company which did not brew non-pasteurized beer.) To help offset this loss, in 2005 Coors expanded its existing operations at its Virginia brewery. In 2006 and 2007 Coors expanded its beer production capacities with joint operations at various Molson's Canadian breweries. Coors has estimated that each new brewery cost about $200 million to construct and was reluctant to commit such resources on its own prior to any mergers. Thus, on average, Coors has had to ship its beer eight to nine times further than its competitors. Also, Coors only has a maximum warehouse capacity in Golden, Colorado of 600,000 cases of beer which is equivalent to one 8-hour production shift. Thus, Coors has had to load per week about 1,500 beer trucks from 68 truck docks and about 400 railroad cars from 22 rail docks. This worked out to a beer shipment volume of about 60% trucks and 40% railroad cars. This information reinforced the importance of Coors supply chain project and the need to track such production and shipping performance with Coors balanced scorecard project. Beer Industry: Decade Updates Th sh is ar stu ed d vi y re aC s o ou urc rs e eH w er as o. co m Over the last ten years, Anheuser-Busch (A/B) has maintained its dominant market position in the U.S. beer industry at approximately 50% market share in the face of many mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by its major competitors. In 2004 the Miller brewing company was acquired by South African Breweries (SAB) and has maintained about a 20% U.S. market share. In 2004 Coors acquired the Carling & Bass Brewery in the United Kingdom. In 2005 Coors merged with the Canadian Molson company and has maintained about a 10% U.S. market share. The 1,500 U.S. craft brewers, other small U.S. brewers, and foreign brewers have the remaining 20% U.S. market share. The Coors merger with Molson has produced approximately $175 million of cost savings or synergies annually in 2006 and 2007, primarily from consolidating duplicate support functions (eliminating jobs) in the information technology, administration, finance, accounting and tax areas. In 2007 a proposed joint venture of SABMiller and Molson Coors was announced for their North American operations (for a combined 30% U.S. market share) to be effective in 2008, pending U.S. Justice Department approval concerning antitrust regulations. Ken and his fellow employees were coping with such M&A uncertainties by following the guideline: \"the nearer to the beer\