I need help on these 5 microeconomic questions:

I need help on these 4 microeconomic questions:

Question 31 (2.5 points) Suppose the monopolist is able to practice rst-degree price discrimination. Demand in this monopolist's market is given by the equation Q = 100 5P. The marginal cost is given as: MC = 2. What is the price for the 10th unit purchased? Question 32 (2.5 points) If a natural monopoly is regulated by the government and forced to set a price equal to marginal cost, then the output chosen by the monopoly will be 0 Less than the perfectly competitive level of output and more than the prot maximizing level of output for the monopolist. 0 None of the above. 0 Equal to the level of output a prot maximizing monopoly would produce. 0 Equal to the level of output the market would produce if it was a perfectly competitive market. 0 Greater than the perfectly competitive level of output. Question 33 (2.5 points) Use the following information to answer the next tw_o questions. Consider the following table. Andy and Jenny can each choose between two strategies. Each makes their choice of strategy at the same time (Le. they cannot observe the other agent's move before choosing their own move). Each of the following matrices shows the strategies available to each and the payoff from each strategy choice. The payoff is shown with payoff to Andy rst, then payoff to Jenny. (i.e. In this game, Jenny decides whether to play Left or Right, and Andy decides whether to play Up or Down.) Assume a larger number payoff is superior to a smaller number payoff. 0 Find the dominant strategy for each agent (if one exists). Jenny Left Right Andy Up (4, 3) (-4, 0) Down (0, -1) (0,0) Andy: Up; Jenny Left Andy: Up; Jenny Right O Andy: Down; Jenny Left Andy: Down; Jenny Right ONeither has a dominant strategyQuestion 34 (2.5 points) Consider the following table. . Find the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) of the game Jenny Left Right Andy Up (4, 3) (-4, 0) Down (0, -1) (0,0)we have one Nash equilibrium: (Up, Right) there is no Nash equilibrium we have two Nash equilibria: (Up, Left) and (Down, Right) O we have one Nash equilibrium: (Up, Left) O we have one Nash equilibrium: (Down, Right) we have one Nash equilibrium: (Down, Left)