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I need help solving part A, how to set up the extensive form game. 4 Games about Games There are two rival computer game manufacturers:

I need help solving part A, how to set up the extensive form game.

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4 Games about Games There are two rival computer game manufacturers: Macrosquish (M) and Compusoft (C). M has developed a new design for a computer game that is expected to be quite popular. Once M produces the game, C could decide to have its own engineers clone the game and sell a competing version. Of course this process would be much cheaper if they were to hire some of M's software engineers to do the work. Recognizing this as a possibility, M can make all of its programmers sign an agreement prohibiting them from working for their competitor for a certain length of time once they leave M's employment. We will assume they can make the length of time long enough such that C would not be able to hire any early enough in the product cycle to help out. The problem with this "preemptive" move that M can make is that it is costly as programmers will insist on higher pay to accept the restrictions on post-employment activity. Should M have their employees sign the contract? The full game proceeds as follows: M makes its decision to offer the preemptive contracts (T) or not (R). Once that decision is made and observed, C decides whether or not to clone the game by going (I) or staying (O)ut. If they decide to stay out, the game ends with M receiving a payoff of 400 if it offered the special contracts, 500 if not, C receives nothing in either case. If C decides to enter into the game market, M decides whether or not they wish to (Flight them by aggressively advertising their own product or (N)ot. If they have offered the contracts and choose to fight, the payoffs are 170 for M and -50 for C. If they chose not to fight in that case, the payoffs are 150 for M and 50 for C. If, however, M decided not to offer the special contracts and ends up fighting the payoffs are 230 for M and 90 for C. If they do not fight, then the payoffs are 250 for M and 150 for C. a. Derive the extensive form of this game. b. Find all pure strategy NE of this game. (hint: there are four pure strategy NE) C. Find the sub-game perfect NE of this game. d. In certain parts of the country, Massachusetts in particular, high-tech companies routinely force employees to sign contracts limiting their post employment activity. What does this model suggest about the advisability of doing that

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