I need help soon as possblie for A and B. here are two graphs thst can help

2. How might altruistic behavior come about? Consider the following simple game: - There are two types of people: altruistic (A) and selfish (S). "Luck" randomly assigns people either 10 or 0 units worth of productive resources (e.g., some people are born into a rich family and others into a poor family). So, for any random encounter between two people, one person has 10 resources and the other has 0 - Altruistic individuals always volunteer half of their resources with the other person if the latter has zero. Altruist people never fight - Selfish people never volunteer half of their resources with the other person if the latter has zero - When two selfish people encounter one another they will always fight, as the one with zero will demand half of what the one with 10 has (who refuses to share). Fighting costs each 3 units of resources The game can be summarized as follows, where the \#s w/i each cell summarize the average payout that a particular player would receive given their role in that particular scenario. Using a framework similar to the "Hawks v. Doves" example in class, please do the following: (a) Solve for person i's expected resource payout as a function of the probability that she encounters someone altruistic, pA. Do this twice: once when i is altruistic and once when i is selfish. (b) Graph your solutions from above. Is there a stable equilibrium outcome? If so, what is it? THE EVOLUTIION OF STRATEGIC PREFERENCES FIGURE I2.4 Average Payoffs for Hawks and Doves The average payoffs for both hawks and doves are declining functions of the share of the population consisting of hawks. The mixture of the two types is in equilibrium when the average payoffs are the same for the two types. The hawks and doves example ates how the usefulness of a nce for a certain mode of beof depends on the frequency which others in the population Prefer that behavior. Being a The average payoff relationships for the monetary values assumed in lustration are shown in Figure 12.5. When cooperators and defectors look exactly the same, how will the pro tion evolve over time? As in the hawks and doves example, the rule hete each individual reproduces in proportion to its average payoff: Those withls material payoffs have the resources necessary to raise larger number FIGURE 12.5 Average Payoffs When Cooperators and Defectors Look Alike The expected payoffs for both cooperators and defectors increase with the percentage of cooperators in the population. But no. matter what the initial population share of cooperators is, cooperators earn a lower average payoff than defectors. This means that cooperators are destined for extinction