I need some helps with question B and D. Thank you so much

Two mining companies, Red and Blue, hid for the right to drill a eld. The possible bids are $ 15 Million, $ 25 Million, $ 35 Million, $ 45 Million and $ 5i] Million. The winner is the company with the higher bid. The two companies decide that in the case of a tie [equal bids), Red is the winner and will get the eld. Company Red has ordered a geological survey and, based on the report Jfrom the survey, concludes that getting the eld for more than 13 45 Million is as had as not getting it [assume loss}, except in case of a tie [assume win]. {a} State reasons Why/I how this game can be described as a two-players-zero-sum game E5 Marks] (h) Considering all possible combinations of bids, formulate the payoff matrix for the game. {5 Marks] {c} Explain what is a saddle point. Verify: does the game have a saddle point? [5 Marks] {d} Construct a linear programming model for Company Blue in this game. [5 Marks]