I neeI need help with all of them

Question 2. Congestion externalities lab Consider a smaller version of the congestion externalities lab experiment that we conducted, specifically a setting with 6 participants and a fixed payoff for non-entry of $3.00. Assume that if a participant is indifferent between entering or not, they will enter. /If you missed the lab or want a refresher on the setup, see this hyperlink to a reading by Holt (2005), in particular section "II. Traffic"J Individual payoffs from entry are given by: Entrants 0 2 3 4 5 6 Payoff per entrant $7.50 $6.00 $4.50 $3.00 $1.50 SO Identify the predicted equilibrium number of entrants and provide an economic explanation for why this outcome is the predicted equilibrium. (Hint: consider what the "incentive" to enter would be under various levels of use.) Consider the 3" entrant. What is the value of the externality that the 3" entrant imposes on each one of the other entrants? What is the total value of the externality imposed on all the other entrants by the 3"d entrant? [Do not include the affect the 3" entrant has on him or herself.] Explain... (1) why the decision of a 3"d entrant to enter makes individual rational sense ; (2) and then how the decision by the 3" entrant is detrimental from a social efficiency (aggregate net benefits) perspective. Answer these questions assuming that there are already two entrants and you are considering the incentives and effects of adding just one more entrant (the 3 entrant). Use specific numbers to make your case. Hint: use the phrases "private net benefit" and "social net benefit"