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Company B Advertise Don't Company A advertise 100 Advertise 100 200 200 150 Don't advertise 150 (5 Points) Given the peyof table above, what is the optimal secure decision for each company for each of the following scenarios. Type the correct answer in the box after each question If Company A advertions, then what should Company B do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise In the bos here - If Company A does not advertise, then what should Company B do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here => If Company B adawrites. then what should Company A dot Type Advertise or Don't Advertise In the box here e - if Company B dogs not adverting. then what should Company A dot Type Advertise or Don't Adverting in the box hang - Is a Hath Equilibrium present? Type Yes or No in the box here > 

Company B Company A Advertise Don't advertise Advertise 100 100 200 Don't advertise 200 150 150 (5 Points) Given the payoff table above, what is the optimal secure decision for each company for each of the following scenarios. Type the correct answer in the box after each question If Company A advertises, then what should Company B do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here If Company A does not advertise, then what should Company B do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here-> If Company B advertises, then what should Company A do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here e If Company B does not advertise, then what should Company A do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here Isa Nash Equilibrium present? Type Yes or No in the box here-->