Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Xavier and Yves, own wells that produce natural sparkling water. Each month Xavier and Yves work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Xavier and Yves can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The monthly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table: Quantity (in gallons) Price Total Revenue (and Total Profit) 0 $30.00 $0 20 $27.50 $550 40 $25.00 $1,000 60 $22.50 $1,350 80 $20.00 $1,600 100 $17.50 $1,750 120 $15.00 $1,800 140 $12.50 $1,750 160 $10.00 $1,600 180 $7.50 $1,350 200 $5.00 $1,000 220 $2.50 $550 240 $0 $0 Refer to the table. If Xavier and Yves operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly in the market for water, how much profit will each of them earn (assuming they split the profit evenly)? a. $900 b. $800 c. $875 d. $1,800