Imagine that firm X chooses their quantity first, then firm Y observes the quantity of firm X and chooses their own quantity.What is the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium?Is there a first or second-mover advantage here? You don't need to draw the whole game tree but you should give some kind of explanation for how you came to this equilibrium.

(You may assume that firm X can only choose quantities that are multiples of 200.This prevents you from having to deal with prices that are not on the schedule and makes firm Y's strategy easier to write. )

DATE y X O 600 200 500 400 40 0 600 300 Q4 ~ 1200 Firm x 1100 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 E (400, 400) 300 200 100 Firm y 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 By solving 2 reaction functions, we get Qx- Qy = 400 Both the reaction curves intersect at E, where each firm produces 400 gallons each , therefore making it the Cournot Nash EQuilibrium