Consider the R&D game being played by Huawei and Samsung. Huawei can choose to develop a new camera for its phone (C) or not (N). Samsung observes the choice of Huawei, then can make its own choice of C or N. The payoffs are as follows. If Huawei opted for C and Samsung likewise chose C, the payoffs are (100, 80) for Huawei and Samsung, respectively. If the choices are C by Huawei and N for Samsung, the payoffs are (120, 60). If Huawei opts for N and Samsung C, the payoffs that ensue are (80 120). If Huawei chooses N and Samsung N the payoffs are (140, 100). What are the actions we observe in the credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium?

C by Huawei and C by Samsung.

C by Huawei and N by Samsung

N by Huawei followed by C chosen by Samsung

N by Huawei followed by N by Samsung

Either C by Huawei followed by C by Samsung AND N by Huawei and N by Samsung