In a recession, the effective bargaining power of the union and organization (management) is going to be most effected by limiting effects of the total power and the shifting balance of the relative power (Katz, et al., 2017). Total power represents the total negotiating power of the organization with regard to profits, for both the union and organization on as a whole (Katz et al., 2017). Perhaps best thought of as a pot in a poker game that all parties are playing for; however, during a recession when there is a tightening of profits, there are less chips on the table and less profits to be had for all parties involved, and thus less power to be yielded in total.

Relative power is a variable power that refers to the ability to replace the existing workforce or for the union to withdraw labor (Katz et al., 2017). In a recession where unemployment rises, it is possible for management to find workers more easily and thus labor shortages or strikes (or the threat of strikes) are less effective in negotiations. It should be noted in the current UAW contract negotiations that one of the demands is for auto-manufactures to lessen the reliance on non-union part-time labor. Management will have to weight his demand carefully, as they likely recognize that aside from the cheaper labor that they would be forgoing by conceding this demand, they would also be allowing the balance of relative power to favor the union and their ability to better control the labor in future negotiations.