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In an auction with one item, there are three bidders with private valuations drawn independently from U[4, 10]. (a) Find an equilibrium of the second-price
In an auction with one item, there are three bidders with private valuations drawn independently from U[4, 10].
(a) Find an equilibrium of the second-price auction. What is the expected payoff of a bidder with value v [4, 10]? Show your work.
(b) Using the revenue equivalence theorem, find an equilibrium bidding strategy of the first-price auction. Show your work.
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