In section 9.6 Eavesdropping and Server Database Reading it was asserted that t is extremely difficult, without public key cryptography, to have an authentication scheme which protects against both eavesdropping and server database disclosure. Consider the following authentication protocol. Alice knows a password. Bob, a server that will authenticate Alice, stores a hash of Alice's password. Alice types her password to her workstation. The following exchange occurs: Alice types her name and password, sends to workstation Workstation computes hash of password, sends Alice's name to server Bob Server Bob responds with nonce R, sends to workstation Workstation computes hash of (hash of password, R), sends to Bob Bob computes hash of (hash of expected password, R), compares with received value Is this an example of an authentication scheme that isn't based on public key cryptography and yet guards again both eavesdropping and server database disclosure? Why or why not? In section 9.6 Eavesdropping and Server Database Reading it was asserted that t is extremely difficult, without public key cryptography, to have an authentication scheme which protects against both eavesdropping and server database disclosure. Consider the following authentication protocol. Alice knows a password. Bob, a server that will authenticate Alice, stores a hash of Alice's password. Alice types her password to her workstation. The following exchange occurs: Alice types her name and password, sends to workstation Workstation computes hash of password, sends Alice's name to server Bob Server Bob responds with nonce R, sends to workstation Workstation computes hash of (hash of password, R), sends to Bob Bob computes hash of (hash of expected password, R), compares with received value Is this an example of an authentication scheme that isn't based on public key cryptography and yet guards again both eavesdropping and server database disclosure? Why or why not