(In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.) Suppose the following stage game G is repeated infinitely: R T 3,4 3,2 C 3,8 6,5 D 0,9 9,0 Let U, be the payoff to player / in period t. Player / (i = 1,2) maximizes her average discounted sum of payoffs, given by (1 - 6) _ S u; , where 5 is the common discount factor of both players. Suppose that 1= 1 the players adopt the following trigger strategies: . Player 1: (a) Play C in the first period; in any other period, (b) play C if (C,R) was played in all previous periods and (c) play T otherwise. . Player 2: (a) Play R in the first period; in any other period, (b) play R if (C,R) was played in all previous periods and (c) play L otherwise. What is the lowest value of the discount factor 8 for which the above trigger strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinite repetition of G