(In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.) Suppose the following stage game is repeated infinitely: M R 2,1 3,2 4,1 C 1,3 1,3 4,4 D 1,4 2,2 4,1 Select every of the following statements that is true. The strategy profile which assigns (T.M) to every history , for which is an even number and (C,R) to every history ht for which is an odd number is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. The strategy profile which assigns (T.R) to every history , for which is an even number and (D.L) to every history ht for which t is an odd number is a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. The strategy profile which assigns (D,L) to every history : for which . is an even number and (T.R) to every history t for which & is an odd number is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. The strategy profile which assigns (C.R) to every history : for which is an even number and (T,M) to every history ht for which t is an odd number is a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game.