(In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.) Suppose the following stage game G is repeated infinitely: L M R T 10,0 1,1 2,2 D 7,5 3,7 2,7 Let U,' be the payoff to player / in period t. Player / (/ = 1,2) maximizes her average discounted sum of payoffs, given by (1 - 5) _ S'- u,, where 5 is 1 = 1 the common discount factor of both players. Suppose that the players adopt the following trigger strategies: Player 1: (a) Play D in the first period; in any other period, (b) play D if (D,L) was played in all previous periods and (c) play T otherwise. . Player 2: (a) Play L in the first period; in any other period, (b) play L if (D,L) was played in all previous periods and (c) play R otherwise. What is the lowest value of the discount factor o for which the above trigger strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinite repetition of G