(In this and all other questions in which a game matrix is given, Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column, and if there is a Player 3, she chooses the matrix.) Suppose the following stage game is repeated infinitely: L M R T 8,7 13,5 10,16 C 8,10 11,9 12,2 D 8,10 10,10 15,11 Select every of the following statements that is true. O The strategy profile which assigns (C,M) to every history h, for which t is an even number and (T,R) to every history h, for which t is an odd number is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. O The strategy profile which assigns (C,L) to every history h, for which t is an even number and (D,R) to every history h, for which t is an odd number is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. O The strategy profile which assigns (D,R) to every history h, for which t is an even number and (C,L) to every history h, for which t is an odd number is a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. O The strategy profile which assigns (T.R) to every history h, for which t is an even number and (C,M) to every history h, for which t is an odd number is a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game