In what way is moral (esp. cultural) relativism akin to "horn 2" of the Euthyphro dilemma? How might one understand what we've called "horn 2" as committing something akin to the naturalistic fallacy? How--in some detail--is the Euthyphro Dilemma supposed to rebut Divine Command Theories of ethics? In particular, how does each "horn" work? Why is each problematic for DCTS? Why can't the Divine Command Theorist simply embrace one horn or the other (or both)? Where else might we find Euthyphro-style dilemmas, and why? What does this say about the nature of authority in general and the possibility of disagreement? Why did we cap off our reflections on and worries about moral relativism and the Euthyphro professional codes of ethics for engineers? In what ways is Thrasymachus' ethical egoism "2-tiered"? In what ways is it self-effacing, and why? . What does Thrasymachus mean by 'justice is the advantage of the strong'? How is this compatible with 'justice is following the law'? Why be moral, according to the egoist? According to (Thrasymachus') ethical egoism, why ought the state have a monopoly on violence?