information Cournot game - Consider the incomplete firm 1's MC is c = = 0.5, while firm 2's MC is CL = 0.5 with probability and CH 1 with probability 1 0. Firm 2's MC is private information. Assume the inverse demand function is given by P(Q) = 2 Q, where Q = 91 92. Derive the best response functions for all types of both players, and use them to derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (999). Also compute the Nash equilibria of the complete information Cournot game in which firm 2's MC is commonly known to be CL, and the Nash equilibrium of the complete information Cournot game in which firm 2's MC is commonly known to be c. How do the quantities produced by firm 1 and firm 2 compare to the quantities firm 1 and the corresponding type of firm 2 produce in the incomplete information Cournot game?