Instructions: This is a take home exam. You are supposed to work INDIVIDUALLY. Questions are written in a way that there cannot he answers alike, except for some calculation problems. If I suspect two exams are highly similar, the two exams will be graded a ZERO. Do not jeopardize your grade nor your graduate standing by working or using other student work. The due date is Friday December 30 by 13:10. To submit your take home exam response, you will log into university's TronClass and upload the exam answer le. Only one exam answer file can be uploaded. Students will not be permitted to submit any additional work or an alternative version. Only the original submission will be forwarded for grading. You must show all work for these problems. 1. The ChinaiUnited States trade war is an ongoing economic conflict between the People's Republic of China and the United States. We can think of the U.S. and Chinese trade policies as a simultaneous-move game. The United States and China are considering policies to open or close their domestic markets for trade. The below table depicts the profits of both countries with and without trade. (20 points.) China Open Close Open 20, 20 10, 10 U.S. Close -200, 10 2, 2 Suppose that the United States and China know the above prots and are rational players in this game. Refer to the above table, what is the likely nal trade policy combinati0n(s), given that prot maximization is the objective? Now assume that China is uncertain that the U.S. will behave rationally or not. In particular, China worries that the Biden administration may want to penalize China even if that does not maximize U.S. welfare. How may this affect China's Choice of strategy? How may this change the equilibrium