Instructions * You are asked to compute all the mixed strategy equilibrium points for each game. Clearly state if a game has no mixed strategy equilibrium point other than the pure strategy equilibrium (or, equilibria) played with probability one. The games are all 2x2 and payoffs shown in the given strategic form games are denoted as (Splayer 1, Splayer 2). Assume players prefer more money to less. * Both players are RISK NEUTRAL. * Each player has two pure strategies. * Player 1, Row, has the strategies U and D, respectively. Player 2, Column, has the strategies L and R, respectively. Show your calculations. See the answer template on the next slide. Answer Presentation Format * Write your solutions up using the following template. You should be able to fit answers on the printed versions of this document, or submit them as separate written documents. 1) Report your final answers: List p*=?, q*=? Expected Payoffs of Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. 2) Show your work in the following order: 3) Show the lotteries facing each player --- use the lottery figures as in the class and lecture notes showing the lottery as a tree diagram; 4) Set up the IP conditions. 5) Solve the IP equations for the mixed strategies. 6) Check your answers by computing the expected payoffs --- verify if you plug-in the mixing probabilities in the IP conditions those equations are satisfied. 7) NOTE - I have chosen some different games than in Nash's thesis problems. | think these are better for our purposes. Problem 1. 2 LR S -