Is there a first-mover advantage in the Bertrand duopoly model with homogenous products?

Select one:

No, the second-mover would be able to set a slightly lower price and capture the full market share.

Yes, first-movers always hold the advantage over other firms.

No, first-movers cannot choose a profit maximizing quantity because the second-mover can always produce a bit less and earn higher profits.

Yes, first-movers may have an advantage, but it depends on the model assumptions.

Blueberry bushes can be produced at a constant marginal cost of $10 per bush. there are different types, that grow to different heights. Type 1 which grows up to 1 meter high is priced at $20 per plant, and type 2 which grows to 50 cm in height is priced at $30 per plant. What are the Lerner indices for these two plants?

Select one:

0.5 and 0.67, respectively

1 and 2, respectively

2 and 3, respectively

Both equal one.

Suppose a firm produces identical goods for two separate markets and practices third-degree price discrimination. In the first market the firm charges $30 per unit, and it charges $22 per unit in the second market. Which of the following is true?

Select one:

Both markets have the same elasticities of demand.

We cannot comment on the respective elasticities of demand.

Market 2 has a more elastic demand curve.

The Lerner Index is higher in market 2.

Market 1 has a more elastic demand curve.

For a two-part tariff, the entry fee is based on the:

Select one:

none of the choices given is correct.

access fee and the consumer surplus is equal to the marginal cost.

consumer surplus and the access fee is equal to the marginal cost.

consumer surplus and the producer surplus.

In comparing the Cournot equilibrium with the competitive equilibrium,

Select one:

both profit and output level are higher in Cournot.

profit is higher, and output level is lower in Cournot.

profit is higher, and output level is lower in the competitive equilibrium.

both profit and output level are higher in the competitive equilibrium.

Suppose the market demand curve is P = 40 - 2Q and the constant marginal cost of production is MC = 20. Which of the following is a valid expression for the reaction function of firm 1?

Select one:

Q1 = 5 - Q2

Q1 = 5 - 1/2Q2

Q1 = 10 - 1/2Q2

Q1 = 40 - Q2

Consider the following payoff matrix for a game in which two firms attempt to collude under the Bertrand model:

?Firm B cutsFirm B colludesFirm A cuts6,624,0Firm A colludes0,2412,12

Here, the possible options are to retain the collusive price (collude) or to lower the price in attempt to increase the firm's market share (cut). The payoffs are stated in terms of millions of dollars of profits earned per year. What is the Nash equilibrium for this game?

Select one:

Both firms collude.

B cuts and A colludes.

A cuts and B colludes.

Both firms cut prices.

just the answer is ok

IA. The study of economics is comprised of three general areas: microeconomics, macroeconomics, and econometrics. What is econometrics? Provide a comprehensive definition of econometrics. IB. What are the two general uses of econometric models? List and briefly discuss both of these. IC. The multiple linear regression model was argued, in general, to be superior to the uni-variate linear regression model for two reasons. Considering your response to IB, discuss the two reasons the multiple regression model is superior.PART V Local Optimization (15 points) Perform local optimization on the following basic block. Assume the registers ti (i=1,...,8) are not used outside of this basic block. Show in each step the kind of optimization (e.g., algebraic simplification) and the outcome of this optimization. Apply as many iterations of local optimization as you can. tl = a -4 12=i * 4 13 = tl [t2] 14 =a-4 15 =i * 4 t6 = 14[15] 17 = 13 * t6 18 = sum + 17 sum = 18 i=i+1 1. Kind of optimization: Resulting code: 2. Kind of optimization: Resulting code: 3. Kind of optimization: Resulting code