Its a game theory questuon explain well

1 (i) Alice and Bob participate in a first-price sealed-bid auction, by bidding fa and Lb respectively, where a and b are integers satisfying 0 1 times and both players knew that the game is being repeated exactly n times, how would they play it? Justify your answer. (4 marks) (b) Describe a Nash equilibrium of this repeated game which results in payoffs of -1/(1 - p) for both players. Justify your answer. (2 marks) (c) Is Alice always playing II and Bob always playing B a Nash equilib rium of the repeated game? (2 marks) (d) Find a range of values for p for which there is a Nash Equilibrium (A, B) whose payoff for both players is the same as their payoff if they always played the strategy profile (II, B), and describe A and B. Justify your answers. (8 marks) (ii) The Republic of Alice and the Kingdom of Bob share a polluted river. If the river gets decontaminated, both get a benefit of f4 billion. Alice and Bob will decide simultaneously and independently whether to go ahead with their decontamination projects, and once these are started they cannot be stopped. The cost of decontamination for Alice is f2 billion. The cost of decontamination for Bob is either fl billion or 23 billion: Bob knows this cost but Alice only knows that Bob's cost is fl billion with probability p