John considers auctioning his 2019 Honda Civic. There are two potential bidders. One of them is a friend of John and John knows that this friend values his car at $2,000. John does not know the second bidder's valuation and believes that it is uniformly distributed between 0 and $5,000. The two bidders do not know each other's valuation. They each guess that the other bidder's valuation is uniformly distributed between 0 and $5,000. a) (4pt) Suppose John adopts the secondprice auction and both bidders use their dominant bidding strategies. How much will John's friend bid and what is his friend's expected payoff? What is Johnjs expected revenue? b) (4pt) Suppose John adopts the firstprice auction and both bidders use their linear symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies. How much will John's friend bid and what is his friend's expected payoff? What is John's ex pected revenue