Jones was charged with armed robbery. Krystal LeBlanc, a key government witness, testified that Jones was in the company of other participants in the robbery shortly before it occurred. Jones challenged LeBlanc's testimony on the ground that it was influenced by two incidents that occurred after the crime but prior to trial. Three months after the crime, LeBlanc was summoned by counsel for a co-defendant to attend a probable cause hearing. She wound up sitting in the courtroom in which Jones and a co-defendant were present, handcuffed, and shackled together. LeBlanc had the opportunity to watch them for more than an hour. Neither the prosecutor nor the police planned or participated in arranging this confrontation.

Several months later, LeBlanc again encountered Jones shacked to a co-defendant. While LeBlanc was waiting in a hallway to testify at a suppression hearing on behalf of the government, Jones and a co-defendant were brought past her into the courtroom. Anyone going into the courtroom had to go down the hallway. The prosecutor had not told LeBlanc to sit in the hallway, had not pointed anyone out to LeBlanc, and had not facilitated her opportunity for observation. On both occasions, Jones was the only Black person in shackles that LeBlanc saw that day. LeBlanc also saw Jones and his co-defendant sitting together at the counsel table when she testified.

The trial judge rejected the defense claim that LeBlanc's testimony should be excluded as violative of due process. According to the judge, the suggestive pretrial confrontations between LeBlanc and Jones did not violate due process because the prosecutor played no part in arranging them. The judge also concluded that if a due process violation did occur, the prosecution did not meet its burden of showing that LeBlanc had an independent basis for her identification of Jones. The jury convicted Jones of armed robbery.

Should Jones's conviction be upheld on appeal?