J.T. ex rel. Thode v. Monster Mountain, LLC 754 F.Supp.2d 1323 (M.D. Ala. 2010) In late January of 2009, J.T.-a minor from Indiana and a competitive motocross rider-traveled to Monster Mountain MX Park in Alabama. Prior to departing, J.T.'s parents signed a notarized authorization for James Thompson (J.T.'s coach) to act as their son's legal guardian for the purpose of signing all release of liability and registration forms. To ride at Monster Mountain, all riders are required to pay an entry fee and execute a "Release and Waiver of Liability and Indemnity Agreement" (the "Release") that reads: IN CONSIDERATION of being permitted to enter . . . EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED, for himself, his personal representa- tives, heirs, and next of kin, acknowledges, agrees, and represents that he has or will immediately upon entering . . . [inspect the premises] . . . [and] HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES, AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE the . . . track operator [or] track owner . . . from all liability to the undersigned, his personal representatives, assigns, heirs, and next of kin for any and all loss or damage . . . whether caused by the negligence of the releasees or otherwise while the undersigned292 Business Law I 448 Part Three Contracts approval to compromise and settle her minor child's personal Third, under Alabama law, a parent may not bind a child to injury claim after an injury has occurred, 'it makes little, if any, a settlement releasing the child's post-injury claims without ex- sense to conclude a parent has the authority to release a child's press court approval. This court agrees with the rationale of other cause of action prior to an injury.' ") [Additional case citations jurisdictions that it would be completely illogical if, despite this omitted] Courts have also relied on the policy, also recognized rule, a parent could bind a child, before any injury occurs, to an in Alabama, of the state's role of protecting minors from harm. exculpatory clause releasing parties from any liability for inju- Case citations omitted] ries which might be caused in the future, simply by signing a Third, the only published decisions from other jurisdictions contract on the child's behalf. that have bound children to pre-injury releases executed by Fourth, the weight of authority in other jurisdictions suggests a parent or guardian on the child's behalf have done so in the that the release in this case is not binding. The majority rule in context of a "minor's participation in school-run or community- jurisdictions throughout the United States is that a parent may sponsored activities." [Case citations omitted] By contrast, this not bind a child to a liability waiver. Moreover, and more sig- court is not aware of a single case, that has not been overturned, nificantly, no published decision that has not been overturned that has held these clauses to be binding in the context of a for- holds that a parent may bind a child to a liability waiver in favor profit activity. of a for-profit entity, such as the Monster Mountain Defendants in this case. The few cases that have upheld a pre-injury waiver C. Application to the Case at Bar have made a point of emphasizing that the policy reasons for The court concludes, based on the law of Alabama as well as doing so are based on the fact of the defendant being a non- persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, that the Release profit sponsor of the activity involved, such as with school signed by Thompson on J.T.'s behalf is not binding on J.T. extra-curriculars. Children tend to be vulnerable in such situations, however, :. Based on all of the above considerations, the court concludes in ways adults are not. The parent who reads, understands, and that, under Alabama law, a parent may not bind a child to a pre- executes a waiver of liability for her child is not the person who injury liability waiver in favor of a for-profit activity sponsor by will participate in the activity. First, J.T. is a minor, so the applicable default rule under signing the liability waiver on the child's behalf. Accordingly, Alabama law is that any contract made with J.T. is voidable. the Release Thompson signed on J.T.'s behalf, based on au- Second, there is no exception under current Alabama law that thority given by J.T.'s parents, does not bar J.T. from asserting requires that this court apply a different rule under the facts of a negligence claim against the Monster Mountain Defendants. this case. ... Summary judgment on this issue in favor of the Monster Moun- tain Defendants, therefore, is due to be DENIED. Ethics in Action Joseph Dodson, age 16, bought a 1984 Chevrolet rescind the contract and recover the amount paid for the truck. truck from Burns and Mary Shrader, owners of Before the court could hear the case, a hit-and-run driver Shrader's Auto Sales, for $4,900 cash. At the time, Burns Shrader, believing Dodson to be 18 or 19, did not ask struck Dodson's parked truck, damaging its left front fender. Dodson's age and Dodson did not volunteer it. Dodson drove At the time of the circuit court trial, the truck was worth only the truck for about eight months, when he learned from an auto mechanic that there was a burned valve in the engine. $500. The Shraders argued that Dodson should be responsible Dodson did not have the money for the repairs, so he contin- for paying the difference between the present value of the truck and the $4,900 purchase price. The trial court found in Dodson's favor, ordering the Shraders to refund the $4,900 ued to drive the truck without repair for another month until purchase price upon delivery of the truck. the engine "blew up" and stopped operating. He parked the car in the front yard of his parents' house. He then contacted he Shraders, rescinding the purchase of the truck and request- . What ethical issues are raised in this case? g a full refund. The Shraders refused to accept the truck or to . What is your ethical analysis of Dodson's conduct, Shrad- ve Dodson a refund. Dodson then filed an action s er's conduct, and the trial court's decision? . If you were