just give me the answer please thanks

Both Sara and Hugo are risk neutral and Sara has just hired Hugo to work in her store. Sara can't see if Hugo is working hard, but does know whether he sells $2000 worth of cellphones or only $500 dollars worth. She does know that whenHugo works hard the probability of high sales is 80%, but when Hugo doesn't work hard, the probability of high sales is only 40%. Sara also knows that Hugo has an outside option worth $150, and that working hard for Hugo costs him $200 of utility while not working hard costs him $100 of utility. Suppose that Sara is able to pay a bonus when the sales are high. Let Wh be the wage with the bonus and WI be the wage without the bonus. Which of the following figures depicts the possible set of wage contracts that would result in the Hugo not taking the contract and and exerting high effort? O Wa Wg = 200 + WD Wa = 400 WIN - Wb Wb