Kramerica Industries and Vandelay Industries are two companies that make pricing decisions (high or low). Because of different schedules for their annual meetings, every year Kramerica makes its pricing decision first, then Vandelay makes its decision. The game tree looks like this: Payoffs Kramerica; Vandelay Vandelay high $20,000; $8,500 high 2 low $16,000; $9,700 Kramerica 1 high $23,000; $7,300 low Vandelay 2 low $14,000; $6,800 A game tree showing decisions between Kramerica and Vandelay . Kramerica makes the first choice at node 1, choosing either high or low. If Kramerica chooses high, Vandelay (at node 2) chooses either high (in which case Kramerica earns $20,000 and Vandelay earns $8,500) or low (in which case Kramerica earns $16,000 and Vandelay earns $9,700). If Kramerica chooses low at node 1, Vandelay (at another node 2) chooses either high (in which case Kramerica earns $23,000 and Vandelay earns $7,300) or low (in which case Kramerica earns $14,000 and Vandelay earns $6,800). Using backward induction, Kramerica presumes that if it chooses high, Vandelay will choose Select one: O a. high. O b. low.Vandelay has Select one: O a. a dominant strategy of choosing high. O b. a dominant strategy of choosing low. O c. a strategy of choosing high if Kramerica chooses high, and low if Kramerica chooses low. O d. a strategy of choosing low if Kramerica chooses high, and high if Kramerica chooses low. The Nash equilibrium outcome is for Kramerica to choose and then Vandelay to choose Select one: O a. low; low O b. high; high O c. high; low O d. low; high While they may be used to better inform or attract consumers, why else might firms use practices like price matching and sale-price guarantees? Select one: O a. To make their products seem more homogenous (having closer substitutes). O b. To better conceal their pricing behavior from their rivals. O c. They are implicit ways firms can monitor each other's pricing and better cooperate with each other. O d. To reduce their fixed costs