l. [20 points} In a two-player game, let Q be a mixed strategy of Player 1, and R be a mixed strategy of Player 2. Both Q and R may assign (+) probabilities to one or more pure strategies available to Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. Suppose Player 1's strategy set is {A, B, C}, and that of Player 2 is {D, E, F, G, H}. Dene Q\" = (U3, 0, 2/3), and R\" = (1/5, 0, 0, 2/5, 25). Choose the appropriate phrase to ll in the blanks in the following statements or whether (T ruelF alse), whichever applies. Briey explain your reasoning. Answers without explanation will not be evaluated, and will get zero credit. a. If (9*, R\") is a Nash Equilibrium, the payoff to Player 1 is maximized by playing Q\" if Player 2 is playing R\". TRUE I FALSE b. If (9*, R *) is a Nash Equilibrium, whenever Player 2 is playing R\