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4. Nature {N} and players 1 and 2 play the game represented by the tree above. N plays left with probability 11.53 and right with probability 21.53. The payolf of player 1 is listed rst at each terminal node. a. List all the pure strategies of player 1 and of player 2. b. Represent the extensive form game above as a strategic forrn game in which the payoffs corresponding to strategies of players 1 and 2 are the expected payoffs. c. For the game in part b, nd all the Nash equilibria in which players 1 and '2 play prure strategies. :1. Returning to the extensive forrn garne, consider a behavioral strategy prole in which player 1 plays A. with probability a1 1 plays E with probability b1 and 2 plays G with probability 1:. Let 11 be the belief probability that player 2 attaches to the node following A. Find all the sequential equilibria in which players 1 and 2 play prure strategies (is, where each of 41,151,: takes the 1.raluJe of either [I or 1}. 'Compare your results to those in part c. e. There is a sequential equilibrium in which 5 = l but I] d: a d: l and I] d: c c: 1. Find it and describe it in words.