Let X = 1510. Suppose that the market demand function for a product is given byq=X p. There are two firms in this market: Firm 1 and Firm 2. Entry is impossible. Products are undifferentiated. Production is a one-time game i.e. it is not repeated. The total cost of production for Firmiisc(q_i) = 10q_i.(i.e. the marginal cost is $10, and we ignore the fixed costs.)

1. Suppose that both firms set their quantitysimultaneously. The total output isq=q₁ +q₂, whereq₁ is the output from Firm 1 andq₂ is the output from Firm 2. Calculate the quantity each firm produces in theCournotequilibrium, and determine the market price.
2. Suppose that Firm 1 sets its quantity first, and Firm 2 follows. Calculate the quantity each firm produces in theStackelbergequilibrium, and determine the market price.
3. Suppose that both firms set theirpricessimultaneously. Calculate the quantity they produce in theBertrandequilibrium, and determine the price(s) set by each firm.