List Notes In the following game tree (aka edensive form gama), the feasible strategies (e. possible actions) are represented by nodes 1, 1a and 1 for Fam 1, and nodes 2a and 25 for Firm 2 -Payoffs (or profits) for Firm 1 and Fim 2 are given by the values in parentheses, where, for any strategy set, Firm 1 receives the payoff to the left of the comma and Firm 2 racaves the peof to the night of the (84, 110) T Firm 1 (1a) (92. 105) Firm 2 (28) worl (101 117) Firm 1 (1) tion (3,122) Firm 2 (2b) ge (69,130) Firm 1 (1) ges (77,125) Us asure Determine the resulting profit for each firm (a) Firm 1's choice at node ta results in profit of Firm's choice at node 1b results in profit of 00 Firm 2s choice at node 2s results in prott of 1) Firm 2's thoice at node 2b resus in profit of (e) The equilibrium will be determined by Fem 1's choice at node. 1. Fem T's choice at node 1 will result in profits of for Firm 1 and profit of for Firm 1 and proft of for Fimm 1 and profit of Soe Firm 2 for Firm 2 for Firm 2 for Firm 1 and profit of for Fimm 2 CHECK ANSWER for Fim 1 and