llanhK Isl AL. v. lusts MUJNES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL. No. 2] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 393 U.S'. 503; 393. Ct. 733; 2! L Ed. 2d 73!; 1969 (LS. LEXIS 2443; 49 Ohio 011. 20'222 November 12, I968, Argued February 24, 1969, Decided OPINION MR. JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner John F. Tinker, 15 years old, and petitioner Christopher Eckhardt, 16 years old, attended high schools in Des Moines, Iowa. Petitioner Mary Beth Tinker, John's sister, was a 13-year-old student in junior high school. In December l965, a group of adults and students in Des Moines held a meeting at the Eckhardt home. The group determined to publicize their objections to the hos- tilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce by wearing black armbands during the holiday season and by fasting on December l6 and New Year's Eve. Petitioners and their parents had previously engaged in similar activities, and they decided to participate in the program. The principals of the Des Moines schools became aware of the plan to wear armbands. On December 14, 1965, they met and adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be suspended until he re- turned without the armband. Petitioners were aware of the regulation that the school authorities adopted. On December l6, Mary Beth and ChristoPher were black armbands to their schools. John Tinker wore his armband the next day. They were all sent home and suspended from school until they would come back without their arrnbands. They did not return to school until after the planned period for wearing armbands had expired -- that is, until aer New Year's Day. M- The District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the t e ofs mbolic act that is within the Free entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was closely akin to "pure speech" which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment. First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years. "The Fourteenth Amendment, as new applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discre- tionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are ed- ucating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, it\" we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes. 0n the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for allin-ning the comprehensive authority of the States and of school ofcials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control con- duct in the schools. Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of F in! Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities. The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of skins or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deponrncnt. It does not concern aggres- sive, disruptive action or even group demonstrations. Our _ . ...- D'\"_I" uv-ulvlluln-LAUJIJ- uul type ofsymbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause problem involves direct, primary Firs! Amendment rights of the First Amendment). As we shall discuss, the wear akin to "pure speech." mg of armbands in the circumstances of this case was The school ofcials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners. There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the schools' work or of collision with the rights of other stu- dents to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or action that intrudcs upon the work ofthe schools or the rights of other students. The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas. The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [ra- ther] than through any kind of authoritative selection. Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be so circumscribed that it exists in prin- ciple but not in fact. Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe ha- ven for crackpots. The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to free speech. This provision means what it says. We properly read it to permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected activi- ties in carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not conne the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pam- phlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school a]nman.m Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be so circumscribed that it exists in prin- ciple but not in fact. Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe ha- ven for crackpots. The Constitution says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to free speech. This provision means what it says. We properly read it to permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected activi- ties in carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not conne the perrniSSible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four comers of :1. pam- phlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom. The record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred. These petitioners merely went about their ordained rounds in school. Their deviation consisted only in wearing on their sleeve a band of black cloth, not more than two inches wide. They wore it to exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam hostil- ities and their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known, and, by their example, to inuence others to adopt them. They neither interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of oth- ers. They caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder. In the circumstances. our Constitution does not permit ofcials of the State to deny their form of expression. Reversed and remanded