Methodology: The authors employ a rigorous empirical methodology to test their hypothesis. They use a comprehensive dataset spanning 21 democratic countries from 1988 to 2010, focusing on TTBs as indicators of protectionism. To understand the impact of elections on trade policies, the authors construct a model that accounts for the timing of elections and the imposition of TTBs. They control for various influencing factors, including economic conditions, political orientation of the government, and trade openness. By meticulously analyzing this dataset and controlling for these variables, the authors aim to discern patterns and correlations that indicate a systematic relationship between elections and protectionist trade policies. Findings: The study's findings reveal a compelling link between the electoral calendar and the implementation of protectionist trade policies. Specifically, the research demonstrates that policymakers, especially those facing imminent elections, are more likely to resort to TTBs as a strategic move to appeal to voters and interest groups. The imposition of these protectionist measures is influenced by the political considerations of staying in power. As elections draw near, policymakers tend to prioritize short-term political gains, often resulting in the adoption of protectionist policies that might not align with the long-term economic interests of the country. Furthermore