Meyer, E. "Evidence and Argument: The Truth of Prestige and its Performance" 1. a) What is the relationship between prestige and truth in Roman courts? b) How did prestige come into play in Roman courts? c) What boosted prestige and what undermined it?

Answer the above questions based on Elizabeth A. Meyer's article called Evidence and Argument: The Truth of Prestige and its Performance. I also copied the whole article below:

"What is truth?" Pilate is, famously, alleged to have asked Jesus (John 18:38). 5is question, at least phrased this way, was awkward for a Roman court, and indeed modern commentators debate whether truth had any place in the Roman courts at all. For although Cicero called the court "a place for truth" (Clu. 202) and the centrality of truth as an aim of the Roman courts has recently been stressed (Riggsby 1999; Masi Doria 2013, 21-28), this emphasis was in response both to an energetic and well-founded claim that the courts functioned primarily as an agonistic venue that pitted the status ("reputation and place") of plainti8 and defendant against each other (Swarney 1993, 155) and to a challenge that juries rewarded outstanding performance with victory regardless of the facts (Zetzel 1994). It is in the context of this larger debate that the observable lack of emphasis given to the deployment of evidence (at least as we would understand evidence) and the notable obsession with argumentation (including attention lavished on arguments that we would consider unfair or irrelevant) gain signi;cance. For the subordination of evidence to argumentation is not a Roman perversion of justice and truth, but a clue that helps to illuminate the physics of the Roman courts, what forces governed their matter and motion.

Roman legal regulation did not control the use of evidence or the forms of argumentation (Powell and Paterson 2004, 33); here, as Aquilius Gallus once tartly remarked in another legal matter, "nihil ... ad ius; ad Ciceronem" ("nothing involving the law; [it's a matter] for Cicero", Cic. Top. 51). Evidence and argument were elements of the rhetorical art of persuasion, and persuasion, Cicero argued emphatically, was based on "what fellow-citizens ... think, feel, believe, and hope" (De or. 1.223). So success in the courts, the Roman speaker's aim, depended on shared Roman expectations, and these proved remarkably stable from the middle Republic through (at least) the third century ad. Such expectations admitted truth as a desirable goalCicero stated that the role of the judge was "always to follow the truth"but in practice preferred graspable verisimilitude in the presentation of a case.1 5is therefore meant that truth and its methods of demonstrationarguments and evidencereceived their warmest welcome when conveyed by people radiating social prestige, dignitas and auctoritas. For Romans in court, truth and social status were not matter and anti-matter, destined to destroy each other. Rather, while truth was constructed out of arguments and evidence, as matter is of atoms, the sub-atomic particlesthe participants displaying the many worthy and status-related qualities, both internal and external, esteemed in Roman societywere bound together into atoms and molecules by the force of prestige. Moreover, like matter in nature, truth upon investigation was not static: the courts, setting participants into motion, observed and measured their behaviour, for in a trial a man's worthy qualities were not just stressed but, necessarily, performed, and performance under stress proved an individual's worth and thereby demonstrated the truth of his claims. 5is is why the most eventful revelations in the Roman courts took the form of loss of self-control or of rhetorical Duency, not surprise eyewitnesses or newly discovered incriminating documents and why trials were dramatic and entertaining. Explosions of expectations could occur..

Types of evidence ("materials for the proving", materies ad probandum) are listed and discussed in several rhetorical treatises. Cicero (De or. 2.100, 116) mentioned tabulae ("tabletdocuments"), witness-testimony, pacts, agreements, stipulations, laws, senatus consulta, agreements, legal decisions, blood-kin, relatives by marriage, decrees, juristic responses, the lives of the participants; Quintilian (Inst. 5.1.2, borrowing in part from Aristotle) added evidence obtained under torture, previous judgements, rumours, and oaths. Already it is clear that this universe is not our universe: for us, rumours, our relations, and our lives are not "evidence" (May 2002), and forensic science has transformed how our courts can think about facts and evidence. Many of the types of proof listed by Cicero and Quintilian that correspond more closely to our idea of evidence are not seen in action very oFen,2 and indeed only two seem to be referred to with any frequency in actual cases, tabulae and witnesses or written witness-testimony. And only tabulae seem to have independent weight, i.e. impact that comes from the fact of their existence rather than from who made them (for the reasons see Meyer 2004, 218-225). 5e value of the contribution of the other types is deeply enmeshed in the quasi-gravitational force ;eld of prestige, where the weight of witnesses and testimony or of written documents such as archives or letters was a8ected by the perceived prestige of their authors (Meyer 2004, 229-232). 5us all of the letters (litterae) that Verres and his friends adduce at trial in 70 bc are proof only (in Cicero's nimble reinterpretation) of Verres' wickednessbecause Verres' villainy, the major argument, Cicero has already established.3 Similarly, because Apuleius' opponents in his trial for magic of 158-159 ad are stupid and uneducated rustics, the letters they bring in as proof have clearly been misread (stupid!) or forged (bad Greek!), although these opponents no doubt intended that, once they had established that Apuleius was a shady character, the letters would prove that he was a magician (Apol. 78-83, 87). No surviving speech, in short, ever gives the impression that it was built around external proofs. Rather, argument was a coherent and joyous masterpiece and itself a type of proof (Cic. De or. 2.116), its component parts and techniques borrowed from the overDowing toolbox of the Greek rhetorical tradition, studied, taught, adapted to a Roman context, and practiced. Most students of rhetoric knew the six or seven parts of a speech (digressio was optional), the thirty or so types of argument (topoi), the commonplaces, the rhetorical ;gures, the collections of exemplary anecdotes, the interpretations of the situation (colores) so beloved of practice declamation: these were con;gured, practiced, and second nature to speakers and listeners alike. Argumentation mattered above all: "to a good judge", said Cicero, "arguments are more powerful than witnesses" (Rep. 1.59). Argument incorporated, but preceded and dominated, proof (Broggini 1964, 243, 271; Pugliese 1964, 282; Crook 1995, 18-21).

But what were arguments used forwhat did speakers use them to say? When one looks for repeated, and therefore widely successful, argumentation, one does not need to look far to see a pattern. No matter the type of case or court, however loFy or humble,4 prestige underpinned any argument a Roman advocate had, and aspects of its preeminence were eventually enshrined in high- and late-Imperial law.5 Sometimes identi;ed as "character-" or "ethos-based" argument (May 1988; Wisse 1989; Riggsby 2004), arguments employing prestige actually depended on a wider and more socially signi;cant set of characteristics than "character" alone implies (Rhet. Her. 3.10-15; Cic. O". 2.44-51; Lendon 1997, 34-43). Known qualities of prestige included bloodline, ;nancial resources, legal status (oFen deducible from clothing), magistracies currently or formerly held, achievements, social importance (were crowds of clients present? important friends?), moral character (both rumoured and judgeable through public deportment) and education. 5e nouns used to indicate prestige were similarly various (estimation, brightness, reputation, glory, weightiness; and especially dignitas and auctoritas, "worthiness" and "authority"), the adjectives tending towards superlatives and evocations of weight and visual brilliance (Garnsey 1970, 223-233; Lendon 1997, 58-63, 272-276).

Roman treatises on rhetoric therefore devote much time to the central task of establishing a protagonist's abundant prestige, and the denial of this to the adversary: most of the atom's mass is in its nucleus. 5e earliest, the pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium, encourages laudation of a protagonist, especially for duties (o#cia), along with vili;cation of an adversary (1.8; 2.5), and outstanding deeds, excellence, and good birth are all grounds (if need be) for pardon (2.25). Cicero expands this (Inv. rhet. 2.32-37), noting also that the protagonist's dignitas is the heart of a credible narration (Inv. rhet. 1.29), that it is especially e8ective to stress, also, other "external" excellences (money, blood-kin, family, friends, homeland, Inv. rhet. 2.177), and that diminution of a protagonist's honor and auctoritas will diminish, also, his defence (Inv. rhet. 2.33). Dignitas, deeds, and an "estimation of life" establish "habits, intentions, deeds": they create the presumption that the story the orator tells is true (De or. 2.182-183). Quintilian agrees, noting the importance of stressing the dignitas of the client (Inst. 2.15.6; 4.1.13). "Character" (animus or persona) is part of what is stressed, but character was de;ned in terms of Roman prestige, not an internal or ethical standard of goodness, and was measured by achievement and deportment that correlated with social standing.6 Poverty, for example, both deformed character and was an external sign of deformed character, while wealth (properly acquired and wisely deployed) was an external sign of internal excellence. In sum, the establishment of prestigious qualities had "a miraculous e8ect", and in openings, in stating the case, or in the peroration was "so strong ... that it was oFen worth more than the case itself", as Cicero has Antonius say in the De oratore (2.184). Quintilian must, indeed, warn the neophyte that the "fortune" (the powerful or humble position) of the protagonist does not alone make the case just or unjust (Inst. 12.7.6).

5is reliance on the prestige of the protagonists was not merely hypothetical, a matter of learned discussion passed on from handbook to handbook. Its importance to Romans in judging a case explains indignation when it is not e8ective (e.g. Cic. Clu. 95), as well as the odd fact, long known, that most Roman court cases took place between approximate social equals. 5e small did not attack the great in court. Why? Because they knew they could not win: most aspects of a person's prestige were public knowledge and could be estimated before a court case was even undertaken. And the great did not attack the small in court either, because this was seen as both unnecessary and poor form. Magistrates, whose oRcial potestas increased their personal prestige and powers of prosecution (Cic. Clu. 154), could themselves bring cases against 5e Great, but risked terrible and public failure. When summoned, by a tribune, on a charge of encouraging allies to rebel in 90 bc, M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos. 115 bc) arrived in the forum, supported (because of illness and great age) by "certain young nobiles", and said, "'Q. Varius asserts that M. Scaurus, princeps senatus, called upon the allies to resort to war; M. Scaurus, princeps senatus, denies the accusation; there is no witness; Quirites, which of us do you choose to believe?' "that is, a tribune or (as he twice repeated) the princeps senatus? "With these words he transformed everyone's attitude, and the tribune of the plebs himself let him go."7 5is preliminary skirmish of prestige proved the parties too unequal. No trial occurred, although other Varian witch-hunts in this ;rst year of the Social War did convict three menof lower status (Gruen 1965,68).

So estimates were made even before a case was brought. Once a case began, prestige also shaped the strategies followed. 5e appeal of prestige-arguments was universal, a kind of lowest-common-denominator argument that all juries, even the least well-educated, could grasp (Cic. Fin. 4.74 on Murena's trial, with May 1988, 59). So protagonists and their relatives are all described in sparkling and superlative prestige-terms by Cicero.8 Opponents, on the other hand, are massively and memorably vili;ed: as, for example, gladiators and gladiatorial trainers, and as men of bad moral character or inappropriately lavish lifestyle or reprehensible personal appearance (including wearing non-Roman clothing).9 Verres alone is depicted as a robber, a pirate, a pestilence; adulterous and impious; poorly educated and ignorant of Greek; ungrateful and disloyal; greedy; a violator of guardianship (tutela); a practitioner of bribery and extortion in the past, and intent on them in the future.10 In sum, "he is a man of no auctoritas" (Verr. 2.3.19). Two hundred years later, Apuleius can denigrate his opponents in many of the same ways, with an added emphasis on how stupid and uneducated they are: audacious, rapacious, and avaricious; rustic, ugly, greedy and drunken, ungrateful; and mocking of the divine.11 It was, therefore, perfectly appropriate to build a case on prestige and prestige alone. Appius Annius Atilius Bradua, attired in patrician sandals and bringing a murder charge (aFer having waited three years, so he could accuse while holding the consulship) against his brotherin-law L. Vibullius Hipparchus Tiberius Claudius Atticus Herodes, o8ered no evidence, preferring only to praise himself, his family and his benefaction to an Italian city. 5is strategy gave Herodes Atticus the opportunity to say in response, with a meaningful look at Bradua's footwear, "you have your good birth in your toe-joints". Herodes himself was equally distinguished (if more Greek) in descent but a man famous for his education and far richer, and had provided benefactions throughout the Empire (as he pointed out). He was acquittedin a case summarised by Philostratus as "the truth prevailed" (VS 555- 556). To remind listeners of a protagonist's great prestige was usually successful.12 Bradua's unfortunate problem was that Herodes' prestige, when all was summed up, was just a nanogram greater than his own.

Speaking of your own wonderfulness, as in this case, was also perfectly acceptable. Cato the Elder too had praised himself, reading out a list of the good deeds of his ancestors as well as his own (ORF3 173), and Pompey had been "an exceptionally eloquent narrator of his own exploits" (Quint. Inst. 11.1.36); perhaps most spectacularly, Apuleius defending himself on a charge of magic stressed that he was rich and a duumvir (joint-mayor) from a "most splendid" (Roman) colony (Apol. 24); oppressively well-educated, a theme throughout the entire speech; and possessed of many high-status friends (Apol. 57-58, 61-62, 72). In rolling one's credits, one only had to avoid exceptionally arrogant immodesty (Cic. De or. 2.209), although even here, as Quintilian put it, "there is a form of eloquence that is becoming in the greatest men, but inadmissable in others" (Inst. 11.1.36; also 8.2.1). 5e evocation of the prestige of a protagonist thus applied a kind of gravitational constant, always giving weight to arguments used in any Roman courtalthough the force prestige exerted was more powerful than gravity, and closer to the orders-of-magnitudegreater "strong interaction" of particle physics. 5e character-argument"my client is this type of person, therefore he could not have done this"is a universal argument, identi;ed as such by Apuleius himself (Apol. 90), and still employed today (Powell and Paterson 2004, 36). Both worked together in the Roman court.

Supporting this fundamental and forceful argument was the prestige of witnesses. As handbooks exhorted, prestigious witnesses added to the prestige of the litigant;13 it was the work of the wise judge "to weigh each [witness] according to his force (momentum)", said Cicero (Font. 21). More witnesses were always better, since their weight accumulated, and only one might eventually be claimed to be insuRcient, "even were he Cato", men said (Plut. Cat. Min. 19.4), which makes clear that it was auctoritas of precisely Cato's sort that was most desirable.14 Indeed, although the seeming independence of witnesses was important (Powell 2010, 28-29)so that they would truly add their own weightit sometimes seemed that witnesses were also called only to praise the defendant. Asconius (Scaur. 28C) noted that Scaurus in 54 bc had been praised by nine consulars, and such so-called laudatores were customarily (said Cicero) at least ten in number (Verr. 2.5.57). 5is was a practice that Pompey tried but failed to curb in 52 bc (Dio Cass. 40.52.2), because prestige had to have its say, because laudatores and witnesses could so rarely be distinguished, and because numbers increased the weight of an advocate's case. Quintilian found it easy to commend honesti as witnesses to the court (Inst. 5.7.24).

Witnesses were chosen carefully, not only for the contribution of their weight but because a witness's contribution was given weight by his own personal standing: his life was his "witness" (Cic. Sull. 79). As Cicero explained in the Topica (73):

it is not every person who is worth consideration as a witness. To establish credibility ($des), prestige (auctoritas) is sought; but auctoritas is given by one's nature or circumstances. Auctoritas from one's nature depends largely on excellence (virtus); in circumstances there are many things that lend auctoritas, such as talent, wealth, age, [good luck,] skill, experience, necessity, and even at times a concurrence of fortuitous events. For it is common belief that the talented (ingeniosi), the wealthy, and those proved worthy (digni) by long life are credible. 5is may not be correct, but the opinion of the common people can hardly be changed, and both those who make judicial decisions and those who judge reputations (existimant) steer their course by that.

Judges of court cases and reputations believe that prestige creates credibility: convincing truth is the possession of those who are prestigious. Cicero claimed that "everyone knows that auctoritas helps in proving the truth, not backing a lie" (Quinct. 75), and Apuleius noted that because one of his own witnesses was "weighty" and "upstanding" his testimony was "most convincing and truthful" (Apol. 61-62). Prestige and truth go hand in hand because the ;rst is the foundation of the second. Hadrian wrote, in the high Empire, that judges were free to judge as they wished, since judges knew "what [witnesses'] dignitas and 'estimation' are", and "sometimes the number of witnesses, sometimes their dignitas and auctoritas, at others common knowledge settles the truth ... you must judge from your own conviction what you believe and what you ;nd not proved" (D.22.5.3.1-2).15

A successful case was, then, buttressed by witnesses whose prestige con;rmed the truth of what they said and added to that of the defendant. 5is emphasis on witnesses' prestige could be so strong that it could even obscure the factual relevance of witnesses' evidence. An extreme example of this in the late Republic: P. Servilius Isauricus happened to be passing by the forum when a trial was taking place, and recognising the defendant, he stepped forward as an impromptu witness and said (Val. Max. 8.5.6):

"Judges, I know nothing about the man on trialwhere he comes from, or what sort of a life he has led, or whether the charge is brought deservedly or out of malice. %is, however, I know: that when he encountered me making a journey on the Via Laurentina in a rather narrow place, he refused to dismount from his horse. You yourselves will judge whether this has any relevance to your scrupulosity (religio); I thought it should not be suppressed." 5e jurors, hardly listening to all the other witnesses, found the defendant guilty. For among them was valued both the greatness (amplitudo) of the man [Servilius Isauricus] and his serious indignation at his neglected dignitas, and they believed that he who did not know how to respect ';rst men' (principes) would rush into any sort of crime.

A consular and former censor with amplitudo speaks about an important character trait in a man he does not know, and of no direct factual relevance to the issue at trial; the man is instantly condemned. 5us you can see, concluded Dio (45.16.1-2), "how the Romans of that period respected men who were prominent through worth (axima) and hated those who behaved insolently, even in the smallest matters". Cicero also acted in accordance with the assumption that prestige and praise mattered most, certainly more than direct knowledge of the facts (see esp. Q. Rosc. 42-44).16

5e branding of opposing witnesses as "light" or insigni;cant (leves) was also, therefore, one aim of the energetic advocate. Sometimes it was easy: women and boys were light by de;nition, as were provincials, especially Greeks ("scruple and trustworthiness in the giving of testimony that nation has never cherished", Cic. Flacc. 9); others, even citizens, could be denounced for poverty, bad moral character, general lack of auctoritas, or for simply being "unknown".17 Confronted with distinguished witnesses, on the other hand, one must either cross-examine them closely or (a dangerous tactic) damage their prestige. When Cicero faced such a situation;ve ";rst men also powerful in the senate" who were "most brilliant"Asconius (Corn. 60-61C) claims that he was very careful indeed, arguing only against their interpretation of events. He "did not do violence to the dignitas of these most distinguished citizens", displaying "moderation" in the "very diRcult task" of not allowing their auctoritas to damage his client.

Protagonists must be, or be depicted as, outstandingly prestigiousto the greatest extent that reality and artfulness would allow; witnesses too, whose standing added to that of the protagonist and acted as a guarantee of the truth of their testimony, even if it was oFen only praise. But the demiurge in this universe of excellence was the advocate himself, who not only set the electrons spinning around the nucleus but added himself to this cloud of particles in motion. For the prestige of the advocate contributed to the case he was arguing too. "Lucius Philippus will ;ght for me, most Dourishing man of the polity in eloquence, weight, and honour; Hortensius, excelling in talent, nobility, estimation, will speak; noble men support me", Naevius is imagined gloating in the Pro Quinctio (72).18 5e Athenians in the second century ad appealed to two massively splendid consular brothers to bring their oppression by a "tyrant" (Herodes Atticus) to the attention of the emperor (Philostr. VS 559). But persons of lower prestige, like Christians or men out of favour with the emperor, had to soldier on with no advocate at all, or with second-choice replacementsfor as Cicero noted in another context, the most diRcult cases got only the worst and most obscure advocates, "perhaps because ... orators must also o8er up their auctoritas" (Clu. 57).19

Since prestige was necessary in an advocate, it (like that of protagonists and witnesses) had to be advertised. Cicero began his career circumspectly, but during and aFer his consulship, he would be less delicatehis friends, his achievements, his talents, and his reputation all ;gure in speeches ostensibly made on behalf of other people.20 5is deeply satisfying strutting was, and was intended, to assist the client, as again the handbooks make clear.21 5is could work in three ways. 5e advocate was physically present, so this added to his client's weight. Torquatus when consul in 65 bc acted as Catiline's advocatus and was depicted (perhaps not only metaphorically) as bringing his sella curulis and ornamenta (Cic. Sull. 81-82) to bear on the case. He was successfulas was Cicero in a trial of his consular year, when he lectured the jury, "listen, listen to the consul!" (Cic. Mur. 78; also 86 and 90). More distinction in an advocate was always better, and a great e8ect could also be achieved by the multiplication of distinguished advocates (Crook 1995, 127-129).

Moreover, Cicero oFen emphasised similarities between himself and his client, so that his prestige would bolster that of his client even more directly,22 and he and other advocates would extend the force of this strategy by emphasising similarities between protagonist, speaker and judge or jury. "I have appeared as the prosecutor" of Verres, Cicero cries, "by the greatest desire and with the greatest expectation of the Roman people, not to increase the ill-will felt for the [senatorial] ordo, but to help in ameliorating our common dishonour!" (Verr. 1.2). Apuleius referred repeatedly to the common bonds of education and philosophy he shared with the judge in his case (Apol. 1, 11, 25, 36, 38, and so on). In 216 ad, a very distinguished Roman speaking for Gohariene peasants (imagine!) before Caracalla intoned: "To the peasants, the contest (agn) is over piety (eusebeia), and to you [Caracalla] nothing is more important than piety. So now they have con;dence in the present instance contesting a case before a most pious king and judge."23 We are like you; we are sure, therefore, that you will ;nd in our favour.

Finally, the speaker's auctoritas undergirds the credibility of the claims he is making on his own, or his client's, behalf. What Cicero is in e8ect saying is, ICicero!believe in him (for he is like me); ICicero!believe in what I am saying; therefore you should believe me and him. And Cicero lost very rarely; there was so much auctoritas "in everything he said", said Quintilian (Inst. 10.1.111-112), that people were ashamed to disagree with him. As Quintilian summarised, a worthy advocate displays the auctoritas of the vir bonus et gravis, thereby adding his own distinction to the case he is representing; and the auctoritas of the speaker, derived from his life and his manner of speaking, imparts $des or trustworthiness to his narration of the case (Quint. Inst. 11.3.184, 4.2.125). If the advocate was believed to be a "good man", then this would be of the utmost weight at every point; indeed, he would thereby add to the case "not the diligence of the advocate but very nearly the credibility of the witness" (Inst. 4.1.7), and in turn the credibility he had shown when a witness, if he had ever been one, enhanced (said Cicero) his auctoritas as an advocate (Sull. 9-10 with Schol. Bob. 7). Opponents also did not hesitate to take cruel advantage of an advocate's low prestige. Cicero in defending Roscius of Ameria pitied Erucius (the opposing speaker) his questionable paternity and his overcon;dent deportment (Rosc. Amer. 46, 59-61). Torquatus in prosecuting Sulla called Cicero a peregrinus (since he was, aFer all, from Arpinum; Cic. Sull. 22-23), and Asinius when defending Urbina's heirs argued openly that the choice of Labienus as plainti8's advocate was proof that the plainti8 had a poor case (Quint. Inst.4.1.11). Even Ulpian later noted the problem created by advocates without any dignitas (D.1.16.9.4). Auctoritas in the speaker was, in short, crucial, as it had been, also, for witnesses and protagonists: for the same reasons, and in many of the same ways.

Merely being prestigious was not, however, enough. To win through, the particular participants in a trial had to move according to laws of the Roman universe: allprotagonist, witnesses, advocateshad to demonstrate their auctoritas, behave in ways appropriate to, and commensurate with, their prestige. Acting and speaking with the dignity and weight attributed to you were necessary, and it was particularly important for those with prestige to show it by revering it in others. 5us, "I know what is due to your weightiness, to this assistance [the assessores], that gathering of citizens, what the dignitas of P. Sestius, the greatness of his danger, my age, and my high position demand", rhapsodised Cicero to the jury (Sest. 119): prestige places many demands upon the speaker, but above all the proper observance of what is due to judge or judges, audience, client and to the advocate himself, and when displayed identi;es and binds all parties to each other into molecules of truth, excluding opponents.24 5e blind man is not even allowed to approach the praetor, because "he cannot see and respect the magistrate's insignia" (D.3.1.1.5). One demonstrates one's own prestige through style and delivery of speech, which "depicts, as it were, the mores of the speaker" (Cic. De or. 2.184), but one shows a ;ne discrimination and understanding of the judge's prestige by varying one's style of address depending on the judge to whom one was speaking (Quint. Inst. 11.1.43-45).

Everyone understood the concept; but mistakes could be made. A distinguished person (or his advocate) could pursue a misguided strategy or bring disgrace upon himself.25 Hectoring, inappropriate joking, impertinent interruption, improper tone, intransigence, indecorous walking or gesturing, or even the wrong clothesall of which showed a lack of deference to the judgesidenti;ed you as the Wrong Sort of Person, as did loss of control. 5ey made you less digni;ed than people had thought; they made you unlike your (digni- ;ed) judges; they made you less worthy of deference, less credible, and more likely to have behaved in the ways opponents said you had. Rutilius Rufus in 92 bc spoke "not as a suppliant or a defendant, but rather as [the jury's] teacher and master" (magister et dominus; Cic. De or. 1.231), andshockinglylost. Isidorus before Claudius, the Alexandrians before Gaius, Appian before Commodus, Christians before provincial governors in martyr-acts, all behave with a ghastly impudence thatfrom a Roman point of viewmade their eventual failure, even execution, all but inevitable.265eir demeanour alone made their essentialwrongness patent: so Pliny drew character-lessons, and diagnosed guilt, from the "pertinaciousness" and "inDexible obstinacy" of the Christians who came before him (Ep. 10.96.3), and Apuleius encouraged Maximus the judge to view Apuleius' persistently pertinax opponent in the same light (Apol. 2-3). Judges quite properly paid attention to appearance (and dress, especially the toga)27 and to deportment, and self-control was important as well. When in dispute with the Athenians in 173 or 174 ad, Herodes Atticus' great prestige barely prevailed against the pressure of Marcus Aurelius' wife and daughter, the standing of the Athenians, and his own grief-crazed invective against the emperora shocking loss of control. "With an aggressive and unguarded tongue ... he cried, '5is is what I get for showing hospitality to Lucius [Verus] ...! 5ese are the grounds on which you judge men, and you sacri;ce me to the whim of a woman and a three-year-old child!' " (Philostr. VS 56-561). Emotional outbursts lowered high prestige or were clear signs of low prestige, for they contravened standards of appropriate behaviour in the great or con;rmed a capacity for immoderation and untruth in the lesser (cf. Quint. Inst. 11.1.29). An opponent's lunge or stumble into impropriety was the hope of every ambitious advocate, as was the judicious, tempered, digni;ed and e8ective demonstration of his own protagonist's prestige.

Witnesses could make mistakes as well. Propercarefulbehaviour had to be observed, for witnesses too could bring harm to themselves (and the case) by losing control, by haranguing rather than testifying. "Remember, when any of you gives testimony", Cicero said, addressing a jury, "how you are accustomed to be careful ... even in the words you use, lest any word seem to be immoderate, or to have slipped out because of some passion!" (Font. 28). 5e demeanour of the witness must be respectful; he must take his task seriously; he must watch his words; he must not contradict himself; he must display no animus. Being Roman, he is of course incapable of lying (unlike Greeks: Cic. Flacc. 9-12), even when righteously incensed. But being pushy or eager to do damage is a mistake and made even prestigious witnesses "light" (Cicero Sull 79; Valerius Maximus 8.5.3, 4). 5e Right Sort of witnesses, behaving properly, were allowed to pose very polite challenges to "good men", but others were not, and passion and anger were to be avoided at all cost.

5e Roman court therefore could, despite its orderly and perceptible mechanics, be a place of surprising events, of unpredictable detonations. Even bystanders, in a kind of Roman "observer e8ect", could a8ect the outcome with their prestige: as Cicero said when defending Publius Sulla, "all those who are present, who make an e8ort, who want the defendant acquitted, defend him to the extent of their participation and auctoritas" (Sull. 4). 5e corona, the circle of spectators at a trial, itself had auctoritas and dignitas (Cic. Rosc. Amer. 1-2),28 sometimes chanted its opinions,29 and when important people adorned it, their particular prestige vibrated invisibly through the area as well. Augustus himself appeared, unsummoned, at two trials, and merely by answering a question swung the verdicts in the directions he wanted (Dio Cass. 54.3.2-3, 54.30.4). Such Imperial interventions from the corona could be very disruptive to expectations, since emperors' prestige (and therefore their claims to truth and deference) was greatest: when Tiberius sat at the edge of the praetor's tribunal and by his presence caused "the lobbying and petitions of the powerful" to be ignored, the result, said the unreconciled Tacitus, was "taking the truth into account, but undermining liberty" (Ann. 1.75.2). Other emperors did understand the force of prestige: neither Antoninus Pius nor Marcus Aurelius convicted the great Herodes Atticus (on charges of wife-murder and tyrannising the Athenians, respectively), but rather than o8end the almost equally prestigious prosecutors, in both cases condemned Herodes' freedmen instead.