midterm exam

Q2. (30 pt) For each of the following two different games do the followings. (i) For each player, write down her strictly and weakly dominated strategies, if any. (ii). Find out the dominant strategy equilibrium, if any. (iid) Perform the successive elimination of strictly dominated strategies and write down the final game table after doing it. Specify for each game whether it is dominance solvable, and, if it is, write down the strategy profile you end up with. (iv). Write down the pure Nash equilibrium strategy-profile(s). B B X V Z X Y Z L 1, 0, 1 5.3.3 2, 1,2 L 2.-3. 1 3. 0.2 3,-1, 1 A M 2. 1. 1 3.6.8 1,2,3 A M 4, 1,0 5.4.7 7, 2, 1 R 0,-3, 4 0,3,2 6, 1,3 R 0, 1,0 1, 3, 1 2,2,0 C chooses Up C chooses Down Player B L Z E 3. 2 2, 4 5. 10 Player A M 1. 8 0.9 0.6 R 4. 1 2,2 7,3