Mixed Nash Equilibria The following problems are intended simply as practice. The models are not intended to describe a social behavior of interest. (a) Consider the following payoff matrix: L R U (1, 5) (5,3) B (2, 1) (3,2) i. Suppose player 1 plays U with probability p and B with probability 1 - p. What must p be for player 2 to be indifferent between L and R? ii. Similarly, suppose player 2 plays L with probability q. What must q be for player 1 to be indifferent between U and B? iii. Suppose player 1 plays U with probability p equal to the one you found in ques- tion 2(a)i and player 2 plays L with probability q equal to the one you found in question 2(a)ii. Show that this is a (mixed) Nash equilibrium