Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely In elections and so their votes "cancel each other out." They each gain 6 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 6 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 3 units of utility. The Tools following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. A-Z Mrs. Ward Vote Don't Vote Vote Mr. Ward: -3, Mrs. Ward: -3 Mr. Ward: 3, Mrs. Ward: -6 Mr. Ward Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -6, Mrs. Ward: 3 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to not vote . and for Mrs. Ward to not vote V . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility vote Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. not vote True or False: This agreement would decrease utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question. O True False This agreement not to vote V a Nash equilibrium