Mr Big Lada, the General Manager (GM) of RMS Bank, has appointed you to advise him on the problems below. Mr Big Lada suspected that someone had committed several crimes.

The first problem was raised by Miss Serai, who reported that every month since February 2020, RM200 was taken from her account and credited into another account belonging to Mr Salad, another account holder of RMS Bank, who she did not know and who had recently opened his bank account in January 2019. Miss Serai denied ever performing any of those transactions as she was in an induced comatose hospital treatment from January 2020 until Oct 2020. Upon inquiries, RMS Bank told her that the money was credited into Mr Salad's bank account, another RMS Bank's customer. She suspected that Mr Salad was related to Mr Kobes, the branch manager. She demanded that Mr Big Lada investigate into the matter before she lodged a police report.

Another customer, Mr Tee Rong, complained that Mr Brocolly, who told him that he was the branch manager of RMS Bank, had cheated him. According to him, Mr Brocolly called him on the 24th March 2020, to notify him that a new bank account was recently opened using his name in another RMS Branch in Penang. The “manager” informed him that RM20, 000 was transferred from his account to another account owned by 'Mr Bayam Brazel' (BB), who was a dangerous drugs dealer and money launderer. Mr Brocolly also told him that the police had informed him about Mr BB’s crime and that RMS Bank must react as swiftly as possible to stop the transfer. Mr Brocoly then requested Mr Tee Rong's assistance to cancel the transfer by providing his bank account password to Mr Brocolly. He also told Mr Tee Rong that his failure to cooperate with RMS Bank would lead to a prosecution.

Fearing the loss of his money, Mr Tee Rong disclosed his online banking log-in details to Mr Brocolly. However, Mr Brocolly explained that he already has all of the details of Mr Tee Rong's online banking from Mr Kobes, except the password. He then revealed his password to Mr Brocolly. He felt good that RMS Bank was taking steps to stop the transfer. However, later that day, he received a message from RMS Bank that RM20, 000.00 was debited from his account via online banking. He was shocked that RMS Bank had not cancelled the transfer. He then lodged a police report. On the same day, he complained to Mr Big Lada about the incident. Mr Big Lada told him that there was no manager by the name of Mr Brocolly at RMS Bank and that only Mr Kobes was the manager of the said branch.

Mr Tom Mato, another customer of RMS Bank, also complained that an 'officer' from RMS Bank told him that the Inland Revenue or 'Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri' (LHDN) had blacklisted him. That officer also told him that the LHDN had informed RMS bank to require all those in the blacklist who were RMS Bank account holders to transfer RM20, 000.00 into an 'LHDN auditor account' before 31st December 2020. This measure was supposed to supplement the unaccounted income from the last ten years of their business.

The said 'officer' also reminded Mr Tom Mato that the punishment for not paying tax is ten years imprisonment without bail with ten strokes of whipping and that his account at RMS Bank will be frozen. Mr Tom Mato was shocked to hear about that, and on the 30th December 2020, he quickly transferred the said amount into the requested bank account. After making the transfer, he then went to the nearest LHDN office to request the certificate

of his online payment earlier on. However, to his surprise, the LHDN officer told him that LHDN had never audited him and he was never in the LHDN blacklist. LHDN officer also advised him to lodge a police report and to consult RMS Bank immediately. He then confronted Mr Kobes, who told him that LHDN has no legal authority to demand such act on the RMS Bank customers.

On 2nd October 2020, Mr Carotte, RMS Bank officer, was very annoyed when he saw about fifty customers were queuing for services at the counter No 12. He knew that the counter was responsible for collecting the deposits for a tour program, 'Europe on the Oriental Express Train Package, which RMS Bank had earlier launched. To join the package tour, each participant had to pay RM20, 000 per person into the RMS Bank account of 'Tour Europe by Train Co.(Pte) Ltd'. The amount will be considered a booking fee, which would secure a place on the first-class coach, commencing in the next season in July 2021.

Mr Carotte approached the queue and offered to speed up their deposit payments. He requested those people to give him their ATM cards and passwords to assist counter No 12 to speed up the process. He collected twenty-four ATM cards from those customers and told them to come back to collect their ATM cards with the slip of payment later. He then went to Mr Kobes' computer, made the deductions from the ATM card accounts and transferred the said amount into the 'Tour European Package Ltd' account number. This account was registered in RMS bank and was created on 1st December 2020. Every ATM cards were later returned to the customers with receipts and guarantee slips stating the train coach numbers and the dates opened for use.

Mr Kobes was on leave on 2nd October 2020. On 2nd January 2021, Mr Carotte resigned from RMS Bank.

Upon an internal investigation authorised by the GM, RMS Bank found that Mr Kobes was the owner of the newly created account in the name of Tour European Package Ltd, which had received a large amount of money amounting to RM459, 000.00 from 2nd December 2020 to 2nd January 2021. By the end of 2nd January 2021, the amount was transferred to Mr Kang Kong's account in Indonesia.

During the police investigation, Mr Kobes identified Mr Sawe, a broadband contractor, as the man he hired in December 2019 to fix a glitch in the broadband installation, which Mr Sawe's company installed it earlier. Mr Sawe's task was to sort the glitch in Mr Kobes' office computer and speed up the approval of the transactions. When Mr Sawe fixed the problem he also installed a box at the back of the computer. He explained to Mr Kobes that it was to remain there to fix the glitch in the future, and must not be turn off at any time.

Upon police investigation, they discovered that the particular box was a computer gadget that played a role in reading the bank's customers lists and detailed profiles of the customers' money. Such details were then copied into a folder and sent to Mr Sawe's email account. The box also created another account in Mr Sawe's name, which a secret program concealed it, and which the usual banking procedures could not trace it.

The police investigation also discovered that Mr Sawe's second covert account had received RM300, 000.00 collection from the RM200 monthly transfers from RMS Bank customers who were not aware of the transactions. The police discovered the concealed bank account

when Miss Serai complained about the missing money from her account, which she had no dealing of it.

The police investigation also revealed that all the money in the covert account was transferred in multiple transactions to Mr Kang Kong's bank account in Toyo Bertam Bank.

Accordingly, Toyo Bertam Bank cooperated to reveal Mr Kang Kong's detailed profile, which identified him as a retired teacher and was then working in one of the banks in Malaysia. The transaction was activated and approved for overseas released authorization, which was instructed from Mr Kobes’ office computer from 3rd December 2019 to 30th January 2021.

The photos and video surveillance in Toyo Bertam Bank and RMS Bank revealed that Mr Kang Kong, Mr Sawe, and Mr Carotte was the same person. Upon further investigation of the computer gadgets, it showed that all phone numbers, conservation and detail transactions were done by or at Mr Kobes' office from 2019 - 2020.

Advise Mr Big Lada on these following matters:
a) The suspect(s) in this case, the crime(s) committed, and the punishment involved.

b) Identify the relevant evidence of the crime
C) Discuss which Court will have the appropriate jurisdiction to hear the case.