My last question. Please help.

Consider a salmon fishery with two fishermen named A and B. Suppose that the marginal benefit for both fishermen is $120 per ton. The marginal cost of fishing for each fisherman is given by:

MC_A = 30+3q_A

MC_B = 20+ q_B

a Calculate the efficient catch for each fisherman if there were no limits to fishing.

b Calculate the marginal net benefit for each fisherman.

cSuppose the fishery imposes a system of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) with a total allowable catch of 100 tons of salmon. Calculate the efficient allocation of quotas for each fisherman.

dNow assume that of the total ITQ of 100 tons, Fisherman A was initially allocated 60 tons while Fisherman B was allocated 40 tons. Would you expect the two fishermen to trade part of their quotas? If no, why not? If yes, who would trade what amount?