Oligopoly#2. Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and that they are the only firms in the market. Their costs are given by C1=60Q, and C2=60Q2, where Q1 is the output of Firm 1 and Q2 the output of Firm 2. Price is determined by the following demand curve: P=300-Q where Q=Q1+Q2. a. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Calculate the profit of each firm at this equilibrium. b. Suppose the two firms form a cartel to maximize joint profits. How many widgets will be produced? Calculate each firm's profit. c. Suppose Firm I were the only firm in the industry. How would market output and Firm I's profit differs from that found in part b above? d. Returning to the duopoly of part b, suppose Firm 1 abides by the agreement, but Firm 2 cheats by increasing production. How many widgets will Firm 2 produce? What will be each firm's profits