only answer #3

Q3. What impact did allowing everyone to chat have on contributions? How do you think the order of normal and chat treatments mattered for this? Class Data Year Hours in Total Treatment Field Food 1607 43 173 Normal 1608 54 184 Normal 1609 43 173 Normal 16096 41 171 Normal 1609c 42 172 Normal 1609d 37 167 Normal 1609e 42 172 Normal 1609f 30 160 Normal 1609g 105 235 Chat 1609h 56 186 Chat 16091 39 169 Chat 1609j 39 169 Chat 1609k 62 192 Observation 16091 45 175 Observation 1610 130 260 Private 1611 130 260 Private Data regarding contributions to the public good can be found in the table below. The class participated in four treatments: normal, chat, observation, & private. Each period, each of the 13 people had a budget of 10 hours. An hour in the field generated a payoff of 2 that was split among everyone and an hour in the forest generated a payoff of 1 but was not shared. Q1. Specify the MPCR for the normal treatment. Determine the Nash equilibrium payoff if players are self-interested and determine the socially optimal outcome. Q2. Plot the contributions over time. How do your results for the normal treatment compare to those in Isaac and Walker (1988) as shown in their Figure 2? Q3. What impact did allowing everyone to chat have on contributions? How do you think the order of normal and chat treatments mattered for this? Q3. What impact did allowing everyone to chat have on contributions? How do you think the order of normal and chat treatments mattered for this? Class Data Year Hours in Total Treatment Field Food 1607 43 173 Normal 1608 54 184 Normal 1609 43 173 Normal 16096 41 171 Normal 1609c 42 172 Normal 1609d 37 167 Normal 1609e 42 172 Normal 1609f 30 160 Normal 1609g 105 235 Chat 1609h 56 186 Chat 16091 39 169 Chat 1609j 39 169 Chat 1609k 62 192 Observation 16091 45 175 Observation 1610 130 260 Private 1611 130 260 Private Data regarding contributions to the public good can be found in the table below. The class participated in four treatments: normal, chat, observation, & private. Each period, each of the 13 people had a budget of 10 hours. An hour in the field generated a payoff of 2 that was split among everyone and an hour in the forest generated a payoff of 1 but was not shared. Q1. Specify the MPCR for the normal treatment. Determine the Nash equilibrium payoff if players are self-interested and determine the socially optimal outcome. Q2. Plot the contributions over time. How do your results for the normal treatment compare to those in Isaac and Walker (1988) as shown in their Figure 2? Q3. What impact did allowing everyone to chat have on contributions? How do you think the order of normal and chat treatments mattered for this