other player's strategy. Also graph the best-response functions for the case of c = 2. (c) Suppose c = 8. Is (pi, P;) = (2, 2) Nash equilibrium? Problem 5. Consider the following game. U 3,0 6,6 D 6,6 0,3 (a) Find all Nash equilibrium in mired strategies by constructing the best response graphs. (b) Can you find a mired strategy profile (01, 02) such that u, (01, 02) = 5, U2 (01, 02) = 4? Problem 6. Consider the given strategic form game. (a) Find best response for player 2, BR,(6,) if a, = (1, ], ;). (b) Find the set UD1, the set of all undominated strategies for player 1. (c) Find the result of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies