Paola, Qingmin, Rhonda, Santeri, and Truc live on the same street. They are considering jointly spending money to plant some trees to beautify their street. Trees are a public good, i.e. each tree benefits everyone, but different people enjoy trees to different degrees. Each of the five neighbors is able to quantify their enjoyment from the trees in dollar terms (i.e. they have quasi-linear utility). If x 0 trees are planted then: Paola gets 800x dollars worth of benefit from the trees; Qingmin gets 600x dollars of benefit; Rhonda gets 200x dollars of benefit; 2 Santeri gets 400x dollars of benefit; Truc gets 360x dollars of benefit. Each tree that is planted costs 100 dollars. The neighbors have agreed that the costs will just be divided equallyso everyone pays 20 dollars per tree. So the only question is how many trees to plant. Since everyone has different preferences about this, and they need to make a decision jointly, they plan to vote. Specifically, they would like to use Condorcet's voting method. Suppose that the group of neighbors can choose any number of trees x = 1, 2, . . . , 500. (The street